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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Borderlands are often peripheral geographically, administratively, and economically. A 
particularly illustrative case is the Szczecin area at the border between Poland and Germany, 
where a large city on one side neighbours to a sparsely populated hinterland on the other. 
There is a number of similar cases throughout Europe, but studies on them point to a mixed 
level of linkages following the opening and removal of the physical border. 
 
At the project’s start there were few if any studies on the Szczecin area per se, which was here 
studied through various methods. On the one hand, different pre-EU enlargement plans and 
visions for the area’s development were compared with practices and realities of recent years. 
This shows that earlier imaginations on the development potentials have not quite 
materialised, although some of them were probably too optimistic and ambitious from the 
beginning. Some of the area’s potentials following EU-enlargement have been more 
successfully exploited than others, and disproportionately by actors coming from outside. On 
the other hand, cross-border contacts were studied in the discourses on and attitudes towards 
the other side among local and regional elites, and among local residents more generally. This 
revealed a polarised attitudinal landscape, not least when compared to country-wide opinion 
surveys in both Germany and Poland. This is in line with other studies showing that identities 
are particularly accentuated in border situations, where the Other is more frequently 
encountered. 
 
These results support recent investigations pointing to a continued relevance of the border 
even after the physical barriers are removed. At the same time, another contribution of this 
work to border studies is that the time and contingency of the importance of identities and of 
the border needs more attention. In the Szczecin area, awareness of national identities and of 
the boundary appeared to be particularly high just after changes in the border’s status 
occurred – i.e. in 1989–1991, and then around the years 2007–2010. But while its importance 
may be fluctuating over time, given the opportunities and resources the boundary provides it 
will always be maintained in some forms. 
 
 
Keywords: cross-border regional development, Polish-German border, Szczecin, (national) 
identities, border attitudes, the Other 
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Preface 
This doctoral dissertation is part of the output of the interdisciplinary research project ‘The 
influence of political territorial hierarchies on local development and relations in cross-border 
areas: the role of Szczecin as a central place in relation to the divided Pomeranian hinterland’ 
(nr. 3016801). The project ran from 2008 through 2013 and was financed by the Baltic Sea 
Foundation
1
, based at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES)
2
 at Södertörn 
University, Sweden. It was coordinated by one of my supervisors, Professor Thomas Lundén 
(Human geography), and by Professor Anders Mellbourn (Political science), both part-time. 
Another political scientist, Doctor Joachim von Wedel, was a post-doc in the project during 
2009–2010. Apart of being a project member I myself have been enrolled in the PhD program 
of the Department of Human Geography at Stockholm University, Sweden. My supervisor at 
the Department was Professor Gunnel Forsberg. 
 
A unique feature of our research team lay in the members’ various backgrounds, which 
combined proved to have bi-disciplinary and multinational
3
 characteristics. As always, this 
could at times pose a few challenges. Doctor von Wedel has been based in Berlin, implying 
that the rest of us could meet him in person just a few times per semester, either at CBEES or 
in our study area, conducting fieldwork together or participating in local professional events 
including conferences. Nevertheless, the long distances could of course occasionally imply 
smaller challenges to our common work. At the same time, Doctor von Wedel’s presence in 
Berlin has been a great help for establishing contacts and organising practical matters in the 
study area. 
 
Professor Lundén has studied borders since the early 1970s, with an emphasis on their impact 
on the individual’s spatial behaviour and needs (1973, 2004). His particular interests include 
the relation between borders and language, ethnicity, religion (2011a), and education (2011b). 
 
Professor Mellbourn has besides academia a background in journalism and foreign policy 
analysis. Thus his role in the team included contacts with media: he co-authored an article 
with Professor Lundén in a Swedish major daily (2008). Professor Mellbourn was also active 
during our interviews with local elites (see especially Paper III). Moreover, he co-authored the 
first academic contribution of the project (Paper I). 
 
                                                 
1
 The homepage of the Foundation is: http://ostersjostiftelsen.se/in-english  
2
 The homepage of the Centre is: 
http://webappl.web.sh.se/p3/ext/content.nsf/aget?openagent&key=about_us_1301902860317  
3
 Find more on this in Paper III as well as in sub-chapter 2.2. 
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Doctor von Wedel’s written contributions within the project’s framework include an article on 
the “re-medievalisation” of European borders on the example of our case (2010a), and one on 
the cross-border cooperation of religious communities in the area (2010b). 
 
My own main interest has been cross-boundary relations in Central and Eastern Europe. After 
a historical period of mutual isolation in the ‘short twentieth century’4, what happens between 
these countries and peoples when physical borders are gradually opened? 
 
                                                 
4
 Hobsbawm (1994) used this notion to classify the period 1914-1989/91, which he saw as the disastrous failures 
of state communism, capitalism, and nationalism. I borrow it here as the same time-span also marks a historical 
period of closed borders, which from a longue durée perspective is fairly unusual. 
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1 Introduction 
Conditions for cross-border flows have altered tremendously in the past two–three decades, 
since political borders – at least in parts of the world – are increasingly open. Liberalisation, 
deregulation, and transformation of what predominantly were Keynesian economic systems 
are some of the major contributing forces to this new-old state of affairs. Within the European 
Union (EU), the parallel processes of European integration are an important element of the 
easing of borders. Some of the milestones in this development have been the launching of 
support programs for institutionalised cooperation between local authorities at the borders of 
European Community Member States. The first so-called Euroregion was established already 
in 1958 in the Dutch-German borderland; since then, this and other forms of cross-border 
cooperation have developed throughout the continent (Perkmann 2003: 154), including the 
Interreg-programmes (Medeiros 2011) launched in 1989. 
 
In the Central and East European context, permeable borders are a more recent phenomenon. 
Despite the rhetoric of socialist brotherhood (Zatlin 2007: 683), the states of the Eastern bloc 
kept their boundaries hermetically sealed in order to avoid any potential conflicts with their 
neighbouring countries (whose populations often included ethnic minorities of the titular 
nations of the surrounding entities
5
), and to strengthen cohesion within their own domains. It 
is thus an irony of history that the socialist regimes contributed at least as much to strengthen 
the national identities of their subjects as did non-socialist ones. As is often the case, the logic 
of nation- or community-building ideology implied the inclusion of some and the exclusion of 
others. 
 
A series of historical events since the change of system in 1989 have then triggered a wide 
range of developments that came to transform the relations between these countries. At the 
same time, the specific development trajectories of Central and East Europe are more and 
more relativised (FSO 2009), for at least two reasons. One, these countries are increasingly 
treated within a European context. Second, deeper integration processes have begun relatively 
recently even in Western Europe
6
, with the establishment of the Schengen Area of open 
borders being an important milestone in the early 1990s. Indeed, the growing scale of some of 
the border-transgressing developments that are the subject of this work – such as cross-border 
commuting and residential mobility (Paper IV), or trans-border spatial planning (Papers II, III, 
and partly I) – are relatively new in most of Europe. Thus studying the effects of such trends 
on citizens’ identities and attitudes (Paper IV) began only more recently. 
                                                 
5
 The Hungarian-Romanian border is illustrative here, which according to Toca (2012) was one of Europe’s most 
closed ones during this time. 
6
 The exceptions here are perhaps the Benelux and the Nordic countries, which started deeper cooperation 
already from the mid-twentieth century on, including the freedom to travel etc. 
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This dissertation is a compilation thesis where a larger theoretical framework is supported by 
a number of smaller studies, united by their focus on the same geographic area, the German-
Polish borderland around Szczecin. The individual studies (Papers I–IV) are preceded by a 
comprehensive summary, itself divided into six chapters. Following this short introductory 
chapter, chapter 2 presents the motivations, aims, methods, as well as the key concepts of the 
research project. Chapter 3 introduces Polish-German relations in general, and in the study 
area in particular. Chapter 4 presents three different but related conceptual approaches to the 
study of borders, supported by a number of empirical examples and observations from the 
study area and beyond. Chapter 5 briefly summarises and complements the individual papers. 
Finally, chapter 6 makes attempts at some general conclusions based on both this text and the 
papers. 
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2 The research project 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Background and motivation 
 
Our interest for the study area (Figure 1) was triggered by a number of developments that 
followed the EU’s enlargement to include Poland (as well as other countries in East Central 
Europe). Hundreds of Poles from the border-near city of Szczecin started moving to cheaper 
or better housing just across the border in Germany, and commuting to their jobs and relatives 
in the Polish city. People in western Poland have increasingly been using the airports in 
Berlin, with Germans more and more frequently visiting shops, markets, hairdressers, taking 
advantage of wellness and cultural offers on the Polish side. At the same time, there was a 
knowledge vacuum on the effects of such developments in general, and in this geographic 
area in particular. A number of studies have already been conducted on the “divided cities” 
along the famous Oder-Neisse river border (Stokłosa 2003, Asher & Jańczak 2007), but the 
borderland around Szczecin, which is by far the largest city along the Polish-German border, 
appeared as understudied. 
 
Figure 1. Two maps of the German-Polish borderland around Szczecin. The orange broken line marks 
the border between Germany and Poland, with the dotted purple lines indicating the borders of sub-
state entities. 
 
 
 
Source: DeLore World Basemap – ESRI (2013) 
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Source: DeLore World Basemap – ESRI (2012) 
 
Interlinkages between two sides of a borderland are not necessarily taking place just because 
physical barriers are lifted: there must often be a motivation there for crossing an international 
boundary, an action that in most parts of the world remains concomitant with bureaucratic or 
socio-linguistic challenges. In our area, one such driving force that we observed at the start 
were the obvious asymmetries characterising the two sides of the boundary. On the Polish 
side we have a large city located right at the border, Szczecin, with over 400,000 inhabitants. 
At the same time, the German side is characterised by a very sparse population and high out-
migration (Reichert-Schick 2010). Scott noted already in the nineties that this area is “a highly 
polarized cross-border region with the important Baltic port city of Szczecin and its sparsely 
populated hinterland” (1998: 612), but to the best of our knowledge the case has not been 
dealt with at greater length, certainly at the time of the project’s start. From a theoretical 
perspective at least, such a situation would imply that when the physical barriers – the state 
border – are abandoned various rural–urban relations should develop, such as suburbanisation, 
commuting, and the use of recreational areas by city-residents. Such developments have been 
observed in similar cases across Europe, like Basel, Geneva, Lille, Luxembourg, Saarbrücken, 
17 
 
Strasbourg (Decoville & al. 2010), Trieste (Jagodic 2012), and Oradea (Toca 2012). Before 
Poland joined the Schengen Area, a lack of Szczecin’s influence on its hinterland was noted 
by for instance Heinrichs (2006: 656). Yet increased links would also mean that private and 
public services such as schools and kindergartens that are being shut down on the German 
side could be maintained by an influx of new inhabitants from the large neighbouring city. 
This could in turn save local jobs and alleviate the emigration of local German inhabitants. 
Scott raised a warning finger by pointing out the severe economic situation in the area: 
 
[t]he postponement of infrastructural improvements … could have long-term detrimental impacts on 
most of the border region as it would effectively isolate large portions of northern Brandenburg, 
eastern Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (including the industrial centre of Schwedt), and the Polish 
voivodships of Szczecin and Gorzow from future east-west and north-south transportation flows. 
(Scott 1998: 615) 
 
Accordingly, a number of commentators and decision-makers not least in Germany and 
Poland
7
 have been expecting that the strong spatial asymmetries between the two sides of the 
Polish-German borderland near Szczecin could and should after the opening of the border 
trigger a dynamic cross-border development, leading to substantial interlinkages and to the 
gradual diminishing of various types of imbalances. Whether this is proving to be the case 
should be of interest not just to border studies and human geography but also to other fields 
such as regional studies, spatial planning, (trans)nationalism studies, international relations 
(IR), as well as European studies. More specifically, as the developments at stake are taking 
place in the context of an EU and Schengen enlargement, the experiences of this case should 
be of interest to other areas finding themselves in a similar situation in the present or in the 
future (e.g. Subotica at the Serbian-Hungarian border or Uzhhorod at the Ukrainian-Slovak 
border). 
 
 
2.2 Aim and research questions 
 
That the above expectations are being materialised is of course not at all obvious, for several 
reasons. One, as described in chapter 3, German-Polish relations have been far from free of 
controversies up until very recently, with some of these burdens lingering on. Second, even if 
the two nations manage to process the dark sides of their shared history, increased contacts 
will not automatically lead to an improvement of relations and thus to significantly increased 
contacts across the border: several studies point out that even when actors are engaged in 
cross-border cooperation, national structures can be sustained or even strengthened (see 4.2). 
Yet in some comparable cases (see 2.1, 4.2.3), significant synergies have been taking place. 
 
Thus the overarching aim of the thesis is to analyse how the opening of the physical border 
affects the two sides of the northern Polish-German borderland. This is of course a rather 
general formulation, and the individual papers were guided by more specific goals and 
questions. Nevertheless, it reflects the underlying interest throughout the research project. 
                                                 
7
 See Paper II and sub-chapter 3.3 for references. 
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The main research question is: In which respects has the gradual opening of the border been 
leading to Szczecin’s emergence as a cross-border centre of the northern Polish-German 
borderland, as predicted or desired by a number of commentators? This larger question was 
broken down to more specific questions that guided the individual papers, namely: How and 
why has the opening of the border affected both sides in terms of 
 cross-border cooperation, spatial planning and regional development? (Papers I and II) 
 discourses, decisions and actions of local and regional elites? (Paper III) 
 attitudes of local German and Polish residents towards each other? (Paper IV) 
 
A secondary research question is: Are the attitudes of Germans and Poles towards each other 
different at the border in the study area compared to the bi-national level at large? 
 
 
2.3 Delimitations 
 
Setting the time limit is of course rarely an easy task when we are dealing with societal 
processes that often articulate themselves in a time-span of at least several years. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, we are lucky to have an important milestone of 1989, the year when all 
the Soviet satellites of the region have begun opening their borders to the outside world, and 
ironically also towards each other. Between the EU and Poland, all barriers to trade shall have 
been eliminated already in the 1990s (Pásztor 2013: 67). Of course the country’s entrance to 
the Union in May 2004 strengthened ties further and joining the Schengen Area in December 
2007 made travelling and moving easier. Finally, Germany’s lifting of temporary restrictions 
on labour from the new member states in May 2011 abolished the last formal barrier to full 
mobility between the two countries. Thus while the time limit is the period since the turn of 
events in 1989, the years since EU enlargement stand in the forefront of interest. This gave a 
time-span of a few years to see in which directions cross-border trends are developing. 
 
The spatial delimitation is perhaps even more challenging. At least among (Anglo-Saxon) 
social scientists
8
, there is today a general consensus that all demarcations in space – just as in 
time – are social constructions made to serve various purposes: in the case of scholars, at best 
mostly for the sake of “researchability”. Meanwhile, the ‘spatial turn’ (Warf & Arias 2009, 
Döring & Thielmann 2008) has challenged earlier ideas of space and distance being fixed and 
stable. Seen from this perspective, the city of Szczecin for instance is apart from its physical 
location everywhere where it is made present or revoked: in cross-border networks ranging 
much further than its direct hinterland, like twinning projects and partner cities (Dorsch 
2003); in cyberspace; and in the minds and memories of people who have some relation to the 
city such as former or occasional residents (e.g. expellees, dissidents, migrants) as well as 
other visitors (e.g. tourists, businesspeople, researchers). Nevertheless, what we found most 
interesting in the chosen study area is that a large city is located right at an international 
border but entirely in one state, and it is the consequences of this reality that constitutes the 
                                                 
8
 That this approach is not quite as established outside “Anglo-Saxon social sciences” and among practitioners 
can be evidenced by the concepts presented in sub-chapter 3.3 and Papers I, II, and III. 
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project’s focus. Thus the maps in Figure 1 by and large depict the geographic area under 
scrutiny. 
 
 
2.4 Methodology and data 
 
For the common part of the project, the team’s main method of collecting primary sources 
was conducting elite interviews with a wide range of actors on both sides of the border. This 
included local and regional public officials, policy-makers, academics, but also journalists, 
businesspersons, politicians, and others. These encounters took place during the years 2008–
2010 and constitute the empirical basis of Paper III in particular, in which a wide range of 
methodological considerations on conducting elite interviews are discussed. Further, all our 
six common visits to the study area included making observations and writing field-notes, 
checked and revised by all participants directly upon return. A large number of media reports, 
especially newspaper articles from local, national and international sources have been used. 
 
My own single main empirical contribution was a survey carried out with both Polish and 
German residents in the borderland
9
. This was guided by the methodological considerations of 
Brennan and Xu (2009) among others. I furthermore used and analysed secondary sources of 
various kinds, including academic as well as non-academic publications, reports and statistics 
from different governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
10
. 
 
To a certain extent this work deals with territorial cohesion, which is often studied through 
quantitative methods. While this research does involve quantitative elements (Paper IV), it is 
predominantly based on qualitative methods. This can be motivated by the fact that “[o]nly 
very limited data exist at regional level (NUTS 3) and that which exist mainly focuses on 
economic concerns. The environmental side is far less well represented and the situation is 
even worse in relation to social data” (Hamez 2005: 401). Thus scholars focusing on cross-
border developments often rely on gathering their own material, as our research team did (I 
especially collected own data for Paper IV). 
 
One way of investigating to what extent cross-border dynamics have been taking place in the 
study area is to compare the situation of the past few years with various earlier expectations 
from the 1990s. It is namely since 1989 that visions of exchange could openly be discussed 
under democratic conditions – i.e. involving not just top political officials but a large number 
of societal actors. Such ideas and visions are described in sub-chapter 3.3 as well as in Paper 
II. Another strategy I used (especially in this comprehensive summary and in Paper IV) was 
to keep an eye on developments in other comparable European border-cities such as Trieste, 
Bratislava, or Oradea. However, a full-fledged comparison is beyond the scope of this project 
as it was designed to be a case study. 
 
                                                 
9
 See Paper IV and the questionnaires in the Appendix. 
10
 See especially Paper II and this comprehensive summary. 
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The theoretical approaches that inspired my work predominantly – but not exclusively11 – 
come from the field of border studies (see sub-chapters 4.1 and 4.2). The combined results 
will then serve as a foundation for a final discussion including conclusions (chapter 6). 
 
 
2.5 Self-positioning and reflexivity 
 
In the 1990s an important debate emerged – especially among feminist geographers – on 
reflexivity. Haraway (1991) made the claim that all knowledge is situated, though she still 
believed that by thorough self-reflection researchers can gain more objective knowledges 
(Haraway 1991: 190–191). While stressing the importance of reflection, McDowell (1992) 
and McLafferty (1995) similarly held on to that in certain circumstances it is important to 
offer an assertive claim to truthful knowledge. Rose (1997) subsequently criticised the above 
approaches for not having left ideals of an objective science far enough behind. Instead, her 
intervention emphasised the many uncertainties in knowledge-production: “the questions are 
so presumptuous about the reflective, analytical power of the researcher, that I want to say 
that they should be simply unanswerable: we should not imagine we can answer them” (Rose 
1997: 311). Rose then proposed “to produce nongeneralizing knowledges that can learn from 
other kinds of knowledges” (1997: 318). While these approaches constituted an important 
contribution, such sometimes over-cautious positions regarding the status of sciences and 
knowledge have more recently been criticised (Boghossian 2006). The problem is not only 
that they put heavy breaks on attempts at theory-building that by nature imply generalisations, 
but also that significant insights produced – whether with the ambition to empower certain 
marginalised groups, or “just” for the sake of analysis and problem-solving – run the risk of 
being downplayed to the degree of appearing as irrelevant. At the same time, this is not to say 
that reflexivity should not be exercised at all instances where claims to knowledge-production 
are made. As noted in the previous sub-chapter, one way of increasing reliability is to check 
one’s results against other studies, preferably on the same geographic area or population but 
also on similar cases. This strategy has frequently been adopted throughout this work. 
 
Since questions related to nationality and ethnicity form a crucial aspect of this project, it is 
only appropriate to reflect on these elements at greater length. Three out of the four members 
of the research team have got a neither German nor Polish background, which we nevertheless 
experienced to have contributed to an interesting outsider-perspective on the study area (Paper 
III). It is also true that while all of us speak German and one of us even comes from Germany, 
only one member – Dr. von Wedel – is fluent in Polish. This could bias the amount and nature 
of the data collected in the two languages.
12
 This situation could only to a limited extent be 
counterbalanced by the few Polish language courses that I took. Then again, there are of 
course some secondary data available on the study area in English and Swedish that I used. 
Further, using English with our Polish informants generally worked out relatively well. But 
                                                 
11
 Especially the sources used in sub-chapter 4.3 present an attempt to enrich this work as well as border studies 
with influences not directly associated with the field. 
12
 It should be noted here that several references quoted in the bibliography in German or English are originally 
Polish sources, directly or indirectly transmitted into one of the former two languages. 
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one cannot rule out that using the mother tongue of one group of informants and mostly a 
foreign language with another could create some difference in the level of proximity obtained. 
 
Interestingly, our concern with the study area as a research team from Sweden could at a few 
occasions arise curiosity among interviewees and others. In some cases, explicit hints on the 
fact that the area has a Swedish history (in the 17
th
 century) were articulated – as if to sense 
our reactions upon raising this aspect. At such occasions we would particularly stress that our 
interest lay in the much more recent dynamics of Polish-German relations. While we have not 
studied Swedish engagement in the area per se, our modest impression is in line with Bojar’s 
(1996: 442) earlier observation that Swedish interest for these lands are rather limited. Still, 
the experiences described above illustrate the comparatively strong historical consciousness in 
Central European societies. 
 
In her dissertation Swedish ethnologist Lindelöf (2006: 39–40) discusses her position in her 
research environment in Poland, reporting on questions about her language skills and social 
ties to the country by the locals, including academic colleagues. These questions hardly led 
her to feel less qualified for the research task; instead, she acknowledges to have produced a 
different study (cf. Rose 1997: 313). “The fieldwork was successful, even if it was difficult 
for instance to listen in eavesdrop on the bus or at the cashier or to read short notes on the pin-
board of the student dormitory. Thus I focused more on the interview material”, she writes 
(Lindelöf 2006: 39). While I can identify with Lindelöf’s experiences, despite my limited 
skills in Polish I tried to use as many opportunities as possible to get into a conversation with 
locals on the Polish side of the study area as well (during the use of public transport, at the bar 
etc.), in English or Polish
13
. This means that my positionality as an outsider is perhaps even 
more complex than discussed in Paper III, even though the latter dealt with the whole research 
group. A number of factors could have served to alleviate my otherness in various situations, 
such as my background in Hungary, a society very comparable to the Polish (and formerly to 
the East German); my gender when I spoke to other men; my age upon contact with similarly 
aged people; or my background in large European cities when I talked with Szczeciners. All 
these conditions make my – as anyone’s – position unique, but do not make the interpretative 
tools less valid or applicable (cf. Lindelöf 2006: 40). 
 
Depending on the research questions posed, some of the positions also mentioned above 
appear as more important than others. Whether the fact that all members of the research team 
are male influences the results of our project to a significant extent seems somewhat doubtful, 
but can never be ruled out entirely. A majority of our interviewees – who were predominantly 
chosen for the position they are in – indeed happened to be men14. On the brighter side, my 
informants in the survey were very evenly balanced between women and men (Paper IV). 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 While no direct references are made to these private conversations, they were largely in line with and perhaps 
even contributed to shaping the conclusions in this work. 
14
 See some reasons for and reflections around this in Paper III. 
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2.6 Some key concepts 
 
This sub-chapter does not aim at giving a full account of the concepts below, but at explaining 
how they are commonly used and how I chose to use them. 
 
Generally speaking, the distinction between the terms ‘border’, ‘boundary’, and to a lesser 
extent ‘frontier’ appears to be increasingly blurred. This is evidenced when for instance 
comparing the entries in the fourth (Johnston & al. 2000) and the fifth (Gregory & al. 2009) 
edition of The Dictionary of Human Geography. An important element that is also a potential 
source of confusion is which concepts are or should be used to denote a more narrow 
understanding referring to physical lines of separation, versus a broader notion involving 
wider aspects of social differentiation. According to the fourth edition, “[t]he terms border 
and frontier … seem more ‘matter of fact’, referring to legal or official boundary lines and 
zonal areas, respectively. Boundaries involve perceptions by one or other parties of features 
that distinguish them from one another” (Johnston & al. 2000: 52). The entry notes that some 
writers are using these two concepts in exactly the opposite way, but that the first distinction 
“seems best to endorse” due to its prevalence (ibid). While I did my best to use these notions 
consistently according to this recommendation, a fully coherent application is obviously not 
possible because of quotations. Moreover, the above mentioned distinction is even less 
apparent in the fifth edition. While that version defines ‘border’ as a “form of boundary 
associated with the rise of the modern nation-state and the establishment of an inter-state 
geopolitical order” (Gregory & al. 2009: 52), thus signifying a narrower meaning, it goes on 
to stress the importance of social as well as state practices that produce and reinforce political 
borders. Yet the social dimension is perhaps also here more pronounced in the definition of 
‘boundary’, described as a marker and maker of regulative authority, including the lines 
separating states as much as “racially, religiously, and/or sexually exclusive boundaries” 
(Gregory & al. 2009: 55). 
 
‘Frontier’ then is similarly defined in the two editions as referring “either to the political 
division between two countries or to the settled and uninhabited parts of a country” (Johnston 
& al. 2000: 282, cf. Gregory & al. 2009: 264). While the first meaning obviously appears as 
synonymous with ‘border’ or political boundary, the second one also discusses the term’s 
socio-historical importance for nation-building, not least in the American context. Whereas 
‘frontier’ is less common with European border scholars writing in English (borderland is 
more common), I will later show that it has some relevance in my study area (see 4.1). By and 
large, however, this notion indeed has a more historical connotation, linked with the historic 
expansion of states like Russia or the USA. The confusion of the above terms can also be seen 
in the light of that most other European languages lack a distinction between them. Germanic 
languages other than English use the word Grenze or something very similar, which was in 
fact borrowed into German from the Polish word granica in the 13
th
 century (Czarnecki 2000 
cited by Lipczuk 2001). A German word similar to frontier is perhaps the equally historical 
term Mark (related to the English word ‘march’), in my study area exemplified by such place 
names as Uckermark. 
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The terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ are even more complicated, partly as they mean different 
things in different contexts. According to Gregory and others (2009: 214), “ethnicity is one of 
the most difficult concepts in the social sciences to define: researchers disagree on the 
meaning of the term; social groups differ in their expressions of ethnicity; and some theorists 
challenge the credibility of the concept in the first place”. But their description that “ethnicity 
is seen as both a way in which individuals define their personal identity and a type of social 
stratification that emerges when people form groups based on their real or perceived origins” 
(Gregory & al. 2009: 214) is fairly plausible. Not least Anglo-Saxon authors commonly use 
‘nation’ and ‘state’ as synonyms, but in much of the world – including Central and Eastern 
Europe – the distinction between the two is significant, with the result that nationality and 
ethnicity do not necessarily overlap. I paid attention to this distinction wherever possible (i.e. 
not in quotes). 
 
The term ‘nation-state’ does not feature in this work not just for the aforementioned reason, 
but also for its traditionally normative assumption. As Gregory and others (2009: 489) put it, 
 
The hyphen in nation-state has traditionally symbolized the articulation of nationalism with the 
development of the modern state… None of these articulations have ever been comprehensive and 
complete, and while most nation-states presume to govern all inhabitants as if they were a single 
nation, in practice they often also dominate and marginalize populations who speak minority 
languages, identify with minority ethnic communities and/or who live in borderlands.
15
 
 
Although more debated in the 1980s and 1990s (Gregory & al. 2009: 631–632), the notion of 
‘region’ is not too simple either. Today, most geographers probably agree that “regions are 
based on socially constructed generalizations about the world, that their delimitation and 
representation are artefactual but not purely fictions” (Gregory & al. 2009: 630). A definition 
that would suit my purposes well in this context is that of “an area or zone of indeterminate 
size on the surface of the Earth, whose diverse elements form a functional association” (ibid). 
Yet given that the term ‘area’ seems less loaded than ‘region’ – the former does not even have 
its own entry in The Dictionary of Human Geography (Gregory & al. 2009) – I tried to avoid 
using the latter in connection with my study area, which I tend to call exactly that, or simply 
the Szczecin area. The idea behind this was to abstain from those regionalist – and close to 
deterministic – discourses that see the two sides of the border as “naturally” belonging 
together
16
. 
  
                                                 
15
 See also Flint & Taylor (2007). 
16
 See more of this discussion including examples in Paper II. 
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3 The study area 
 
 
 
 
 
Before dwelling deeper into the particular area under scrutiny, the bi-national relations more 
generally are briefly introduced. 
 
 
3.1 Polish-German relations since World War II 
 
3.1.1 The bi-national relations between 1945 and 1989 
 
As poor as Germany’s relations already were with its neighbouring countries due to the war, 
its ties with Central and Eastern Europe became even more strained due to the expulsion of 
most ethnic Germans from the region in the direct post-war years
17
. This is especially true for 
Poland, for at least three reasons. During the war, it was arguably here that the Third Reich 
committed the toughest atrocities. After the war, it was mostly to Poland that Germany lost a 
significant share (one third) of its pre-war territory. Last but not least, it was from Poland that 
the largest number of Germans were expelled – some five million according to Davies (2001: 
4). 
 
Despite finding themselves in the same political-economic bloc, the regimes of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and of the Polish People’s Republic were from time to time 
launching propaganda campaigns against each other’s countries, not least when they went 
through crises of public confidence and felt a need to emphasise the image of an enemy, or at 
least of an Other. 
 
The physical traces of such policies can still be read in the landscape, not least in the form of 
numerous memorials, statues and monuments that were raised to commemorate events from 
the Second World War as long back in history as the clashes between Germanic and Slavic 
tribes in the tenth century (Asher & Jańczak 2007). Such sites of remembrance were not 
uncommonly located in the borderland (see e.g. Figure 2), sometimes even visible to those 
neighbours against whom they were targeted. The Battle of Cedynia/Zehden in the year 972 
for instance was largely unknown in Poland before World War II, but was mystified and 
instrumentalised by post-war Polish propaganda to justify the Oder-Neisse boundary (which 
in 1945 made this formerly German town Poland’s westernmost settlement), and rendered 
into a German-Polish battle to underline the doctrine of ‘eternal German-Polish enmity’ 
(Gerstenberg & Midalski 2008: 79–82). Several memorials were erected to that effect near 
Cedynia – located half way between Szczecin and Berlin –, including a fifteen-metre-tall 
                                                 
17
 For detailed accounts of the post-WWII expulsion of ethnic Germans from the whole of Central and Eastern 
Europe, see Rock & Wolff (2002) and Kossert (2008). 
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concrete statue of a Polish eagle on a sword that oversees the town and the Oder River from 
Czcibor’s Mountain (Figure 2). After the change of system the propagandistic approach was 
discarded, but the battle retained some prominence and is included in modern Polish curricula 
(Gerstenberg & Midalski 2008: 82–83). 
 
Figure 2. The Polish eagle on a sword at Cedynia, overseeing the Oder River Valley from a hilltop. 
 
 
 
Source: author’s photo, September 2013 
 
The Polish-German (from 1949 East German) border itself remained contested after the war 
particularly in West Germany, with expellee organisations lobbying against its recognition. In 
the GDR the state borders could not be questioned publicly, but remained strongly controlled 
nevertheless. Yet in the early 1970s West and East Germany finally recognised each other and 
thereby their borders (Kamusella 2010), leading the GDR to open up for passport-free travel 
from the Polish People’s Republic (see 3.2). However, with the strengthening of the Solidarity 
movement in Poland in the early 1980s, East Germany again closed the border. Thus apart of 
the détente period, the Cold War has seen a hermetically sealed boundary between Germans 
and Poles, leading to a very limited scale of contacts. 
 
3.1.2 German-Polish relations since 1989 
 
Generally speaking, bilateral relations have significantly improved since the turn of events in 
1989. After its reunification Germany (re-)confirmed the recognition of its borders within a 
few months, and the two countries signed bilateral agreements already in 1990 committing 
themselves to work for good neighbourly relations (Kamusella 2010). 
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There was a shorter shaky period in the mid-2000s (Bender 2005), not least when Poland was 
ruled by leaders demonstrating considerable anti-foreign and not least anti-German sentiment. 
It was also during these years that Germany’s then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder agreed with 
Russia to build the Nord Stream gas pipeline, leading some Polish politicians to see parallels 
with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Leonard & Popescu 2007: 4). 
 
In the more recent past, however, inter-state relations have improved to become as good as 
perhaps never before. In the midst of the euro-crisis, the Polish Foreign Minister famously 
declared that he is now more worried about a passive than an active Germany (Trudell 2011). 
Such a statement needs also to be seen in the light of both countries being regarded to have 
pulled through the economic crisis in 2009–2010 better than most others in Europe. On the 
one hand, German interest in Poland and Eastern Europe should be little surprising: with 12% 
of German foreign exports landing there and production costs remaining low, most companies 
kept making profits in the region even at a time when the economies of those countries were 
in decline (Handelsblatt 2009). On the other hand, according to Newnham (2007) while 
Germany acted out of national interest when it was among the strongest supporters of Polish 
EU membership, the results were positive for both countries. One fourth of Poland’s overall 
trade is now conducted with Germany, and 40% of those exports are later marketed through 
German brands (Gnauck 2014). Further, Poland is the largest net-receiver of EU funds at least 
in absolute numbers (ibid). At the same time the EU’s Cohesion policy – i.e. resources to 
poorer regions – for instance are proving to be mutually beneficial, as companies from net-
payer countries investing in the new Member States are also allocated money (Zawistowski 
2011). 
 
Similarly to the field of political economy a wide range of common actions and initiatives are 
taking place between Polish and German NGOs and civil society members. True, many of the 
exchange programs on different levels are supported by top-down organs such as EU- or 
national institutions, but interest in them appears to be fairly strong. A big share of the events 
announced on the largest German-language forum for actors interested in Eastern Europe, 
Junge Osteuropa Experten
18
, deals with various aspects of Polish society and culture, or 
German-Polish bilateral relations. This wide range of events includes presentations of new 
publications, open lectures, cultural events, language courses, summer schools, various 
programs for multiplicators, and so on. The much improved bi-national relations over the past 
years are not least a result of the long-term efforts of a number of by now well-established 
initiatives such as the Foundation of Polish-German Cooperation, and civil society formations 
like the Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft that has local branches throughout Germany as well 
as in Warsaw. Some of the initiatives – such as the German-Polish Youth Office – particularly 
target young people; there even exist school-books on the history and relations of the two 
countries (e.g. Kneip & Mack 2007). 
 
                                                 
18
 The homepage of the forum is http://www.joe-list.de/. The mailing list has reached close to 12,000 members in 
February 2014 (JOE-Redaktion 2014). 
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Interdisciplinary research specifically on Poland is conducted in Germany at a number of 
universities, for instance in Frankfurt (Oder), Jena, and Halle, but also at hybrid institutions 
such as the Deutsches Polen-Institut in Darmstadt. The German Federal Agency for Civic 
Education (BPB) has a special folder devoted to the contemporary history of German-Polish 
relations
19
. In Poland, the two largest institutions devoted to studying Germany are the 
Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań and the Willy Brandt Center in Wrocław. There is at 
least one shared full educational program on the bilateral relations (offered by the universities 
of Regensburg and Łódź); but above all, the Viadrina European University (Fichter-Wolf & 
Knorr-Siedow 2009) is located on both sides of the Oder River, which constitutes the Polish-
German border between Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice. There is a number of mixed schools on 
lower levels as well in both countries. Among those in the study area, the German-Polish 
secondary school in Löcknitz (Lundén 2011b: 85–86, cover page photo) deserves particular 
attention, although it is a regular German school but where the Polish pupils can take special 
courses in Polish language, history and social studies. The German pupils can choose Polish 
as a second foreign language, but less than half of them do so (Pergande 2011). Elsewhere, a 
similar school in Gartz had to close because of a lack of interest by the German parents 
(Lundén 2011b: 86). 
 
The fact that such institutions of reconciliation are still deemed as necessary over 60 years 
after the war is interpreted by some as indicating that there is room left to improve relations 
(Heinrich 2010). It is indeed a long process: up until the 1980s, there was for instance no 
single university department for Polonistics in what was then the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Even today, the number of people studying Polish in Germany was estimated at 
around 50,000; a figure that can be compared with the approximately 2,400,000 German-
learners in Poland (Telus 2013: 19). When it comes to Germany’s other neighbours, the only 
comparable still existing institute to the best of my knowledge is the Deutsch-Französisches 
Institut (in Ludwigsburg). In fact, Germany’s reconciliation with France has been seen as a 
role-model for its relations with Poland (Vette 2003: 115), and the three countries are even 
collaborating under the label ‘Weimar Triangle’ (Gardner Feldman 1999: 354). 
 
These initiatives seem by and large to bear their fruits, at least on the national levels. Country-
wide opinion surveys indicate a growing sympathy between Germans and Poles vis-á-vis each 
other (Kucharczyk & al. 2013, SDPZ 2011), coupled with a decreasing antipathy (Polen-
Analysen 2011: 13). Even according to a less explicitly positive study the two nations are 
more and more indifferent to each other (Kolarska-Bobińska & Łada 2009), which in the 
historical backdrop can still be interpreted as a positive sign. However, as it will be shown 
later this is not necessarily representative of the local level at the border. 
 
Interesting as Polish-German relations are on the bi-national level, the focus from here on will 
be on the conditions in the study area – i.e. the borderland around Szczecin. Borderlands, in 
                                                 
19
 The folder is (also) online and is available at http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutsch-polnische-
beziehungen/.  
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their role as “laboratories of European integration” (Grix & Knowles 2002: 155), deserve 
particular attention since they can theoretically benefit most from contacts with the other side. 
 
 
3.2 The study area before 1989
20
 
 
If the world goes down, I shall move to Mecklenburg,  
because there everything occurs 50 years later.
 21
 
 
Otto von Bismarck 
 
 
Pomerania (in German Pommern, in Polish Pomorze) is the name of a historic region that 
stretched over what are today northwestern Poland (the West Pomeranian and Pomeranian 
voivodeships) and the eastern part of the German state Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
22
. These 
fertile lowlands have seen much struggle in history, mostly between Germanic and Slavic 
tribes and later between German and Polish troops. After some decades of Polish rule in the 
late tenth century, the area was German-dominated during much of the second millennium. In 
the decades around the fin-de-siècle its centre Stettin
23
 functioned as Berlin’s port city, while 
the island of Usedom (see in Figures 3 and 5) was a popular resort area among residents of the 
imperial capital, earning it the nickname “Berlin’s bathtub” (Dienel & al. 2004). 
 
In 1945 a large part of the territory was transferred to Poland (Figure 3), as a compensation 
for formerly Polish territories annexed by the USSR during the war. To avoid future conflicts 
and because they were charged with collective guilt for the war and its devastations, the vast 
majority of the German residents was resettled into Germany
24
. Their homes in turn were 
overtaken by Poles from central Poland or by Poles and Ukrainians from former Polish areas 
then freshly occupied by the Red Army (Piskorski 1999: 9). The Oder-Neisse line was defined 
as the new Polish-German borderline, with the cities of Stettin – from now on Szczecin – and 
Swinemünde – henceforth Świnoujście – also transferred to Poland (Aischmann 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3. Since Pomerania’s division in 1945, Szczecin (here Stettin, underlined) is located 12 km 
from the border on the Polish side. 
                                                 
20
 This brief historical account has no other ambitions than to serve as a very basic background for readers 
unfamiliar with the area. For more detailed accounts on the region’s history, please turn to the works referred to 
in this sub-chapter. Especially the anthology edited by Piskorski (1999) offers an account with neutral ambitions, 
with contributions from Polish and German experts alike. 
21
 This famous statement shall have been made by Germany’s first Chancellor and is mentioned in several 
places, for example by Gathmann (2007). The translation is mine. 
22
 There are some differences in the German and Polish definition of the region, which have moreover altered in 
time. For a detailed explanation see Piskorski (1999: 5–9). 
23
 I generally use the German place names in pre-1945 contexts (with the obvious exception of quotations), and 
elsewhere the Polish – and today single official – versions. 
24
 For the regional context of the expulsions see Hackmann (1999). 
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Source: Kosbab (2009) 
 
However, few investments were allocated to Szczecin and Poland’s western borderlands by 
the central planners in Warsaw (Gruchman 1967, Dorsch 2003: 74), due to fears of a potential 
German return to the area. This created an atmosphere of temporariness and an image of the 
area as a terra incognita well into the post-war decades
25
. 
 
As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, cross-border flows and contacts were minimised 
during the Cold War. There was indeed an exception to this in the 1970s, when the GDR and 
Poland opened the border to increase human contacts and even to raise mutual understanding 
(Zatlin 2007: 683). While millions of Poles and East Germans visited the other side, the 
measure is still seen as a failure as it exacerbated rather than diminished animosities,  
 
especially at department stores in border cities such as Frankfurt an der Oder, Dresden, and 
Pasewalk. Angry that millions of Poles were engaging in a kind of consumer tourism, traveling to the 
GDR in search of food and clothing that was difficult to find in their own country, many East 
Germans complained, as one man did, that the Poles “are buying everything out from under us”. 
(Zatlin 2007: 684) 
 
Thus it would appear as significant that such attitudes did not emerge in a capitalist economy, 
where “a comparable influx of tourists would most likely be welcomed as representing an 
increase in sales and therefore a stimulus to economic growth”, resting on the idea that 
                                                 
25
 Illustrative here is a scene from a popular Polish movie from the late 1980s: playing at a railway station in 
central Poland, a man and a woman want to get as far away as possible and the latter suggests taking a train to 
Szczecin. (Bajon 1989) 
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“voluntary exchange is always mutually beneficial and therefore welfare-enhancing” (Zatlin 
2007: 685). I therefore now turn to developments in the borderland after the change of system. 
 
 
3.3 The study area since 1989: visions and realities 
 
Cross-border movements received a boost in 1989–1990, but more deep-reaching transborder 
flows were hampered by at least two groups of reasons. On the one hand, at this time 
 
Polish-German citizen relations were at a comparatively low point, with disobliging opinions 
prevailing in the borderlands most of all. Largely due to insecurities over the border’s finality, on the 
occasion of German unification, the Polish public felt much more apprehensive and fearful than any 
of Germany’s western neighbours. Corresponding suspicions prevailed on the German side: when 
the border was opened for visa-free travel in 1991, the first Polish visitors to cross into the German 
border town Frankfurt (Oder) were greeted by stonethrowing right wing extremists. Hostility and 
distrust of the neighbour were deeply entrenched. (Mirwaldt 2005: 248) 
 
On the other hand, “[t]he transformation process has led to a serious loss of jobs on both sides 
of the border” (Krätke 1996: 657). Despite or because of this situation, enthusiasm was large 
and expectations were running high among a number of actors regarding the prospects of 
integration. One particularly ambitious and ambiguous vision was the so-called ‘Stolpe-Plan’, 
named after the incumbent Prime Minister of the eastern German state of Brandenburg. For 
one observer, this 
 
was one of the first attempts to stake out the possibilities for trans-border cooperation with Poland, 
but unfortunately the whole thrust of the plan was perceived by the Polish side as being largely 
aimed at German interests. It included for instance the development of trading outlets on the German 
side (in order to increase Polish purchases), the reduction of intensive agricultural activity in the 
Polish regions, in favour of the building of "weekend" dwellings there - presumably for Germans - 
and the establishment of a German economic area in the port of Szczecin and on the Polish part of 
the island of Usedom. (Kennard 1996: 116) 
 
While Kennard found it unfortunate that Poles were less enthusiastic about these ideas, a 
Polish scholar noted that with this plan, 
 
[t]he function of the Polish areas would be restricted to the supply of raw materials and cheap labour. 
The Euroregion, moreover, should protect the German market from a big influx of cheap labour from 
Poland… A more attractive option would be to create favourable conditions for German capital to be 
invested in enterprises in the Polish part of the Euroregion. In that way semi-manufactured articles 
could be produced in that Polish part, creating jobs for Polish labour. The semi-fabricates eventually 
would be completed in Germany. The creation of Pomerania Euroregion brings such opportunities, 
creating new hope for the citizens of the region and especially Szczecin. (Bojar 1996: 443) 
 
The Euroregion Pomerania that Bojar talks about is a cooperation of a set of municipalities in 
north-eastern Germany, neighbouring north-western Poland, and southern Sweden. While this 
form of institutionalised cooperation has been a common feature along European borderlands 
in the past decades, illustrative of some initial fears particularly on the Polish side is that 
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[i]n the case of Pomerania in the north, the Szczecin voivod, very much a centralist from Warsaw, 
succeeded in delaying the establishment of the trans-border organisation. Due to a fear of German 
influence in the (previously German) Szczecin area, he was very eager to include southern Sweden 
and the Danish island of Bornholm in this region. (Kennard 1996: 116) 
 
In a similar vein, Bojar suggested including Scandinavian regions to “counterbalance the 
strong position of Germany” (1996: 444). Yet another spatial imagination was26 the so-called 
‘Oder region’: 
 
Planning among the Baltic countries produced a concept of spatial development and CBC through an 
Oder region - including the Berlin and Dresden areas of Germany and extending to Szczecin, Zielona 
Gora and Legnica in Poland (Van de Boel, 1994). This drew particular attention to the Pomeranian 
coastlands (especially Szczecin/Swinoujscie) attractive to German and Scandinavian investors, 
especially in the light of a possible Oder waterway linked with the European system. Through the 
Baltic arena Poland is also involved in cooperation with neighbouring countries as part of the 'Green 
Lungs of Europe' project - growing out of an initial 'Green Lungs of Poland' initiative – to coordinate 
activities in networks of national parks and other protected areas. (Turnock 2002: 24–25) 
 
To a certain extent the description above reveals an inherent contradiction; namely whether 
the area should concentrate on developing its maritime industry (Paper II) or rather focus on 
its environmental potentials. This is a dilemma that I will return to. 
 
In spite of some such (initial) concerns a great variety of actors have been optimistic about the 
Szczecin-borderland’s potentials, including Polish regional researchers (cf. Krätke 1996: 653, 
Guz-Vetter 2002, Ciok 2009); city-officials in Szczecin (Dorsch 2003: 74) and Berlin (Senate 
of Berlin 2003); as well as German scholars (Burkhardt 1995), policy consultants (Maack & 
al. 2005), and artists
27
. Particularly illustrative of the ambitious visions is a conceptual image 
of a Polish academic that is clearly inspired by a central place thinking (Figure 4)
28
. 
 
 
Figure 4. Theoretical fields of interaction of the major cities along the German-Polish borderland as 
according to a Wrocław-based scholar. 
 
                                                 
26
 I use the past tense here as it is unclear whether this initiative is still in operation (no recent traces of it can be 
found online). 
27
 In this context, the most interesting example is probably the project Nowa Amerika. Founded as recently as 
2010, this fictive space aims to provoke the conventional geopolitical image of the German-Polish borderland as 
a divided territory, envisioning it instead as a federation made up of the four constitutive states of Szczettinstan, 
Terra Incognita, Lebuser Ziemia, and Schlonsk. Nowa Amerika has its own flag, currency, a citizenship open to 
all, and uses a hybrid language of Polish and German. Its capital is Słubfurt, a combination of two town names – 
Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice – on both sides of the German-Polish border. Unlike ‘real’ entities such as states or 
the Euroregion Pomerania, the borders of Nowa Amerika are explicitly fluid (Kurzwelly 2014). While a 
fascinating artistic project, the level of awareness around it can perhaps be illustrated by the fact that it had 
altogether 723 followers on Facebook in early March 2014. 
28
 The model is discussed but not reproduced in Paper I. 
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Source: Ciok (2009: 150) 
 
Similar spatial development visions (Leitbilder) can be found in Germany, not least in policy 
documents (Lang 2012). However, scholars like Lang 
 
find it problematic to categorize space on the basis of structural distances. This is, in particular, 
problematic as there is no transparent discussion about the relevance and selection of indicators as 
well as thresholds. For example, it remains unclear how and by whom distances are defined within 
which centres are seen as accessible. Moreover, the de facto accessibility of functions and services is 
often unrelated to geographical distance anyway. (2012: 1750) 
 
While the different endowments of the two sides of the border can make a closer cooperation 
a bigger challenge, they are also potentially more fruitful to avoid the peripheral status within 
each of the national entities. One idea behind this project was that it is precisely differences 
and the diverging endowments of the two sides of the border that would motivate particularly 
intensive cross-border movements, as in other cases (Paasi & Prokkola 2008, Rogova 2009: 
34). This can be compared with the notion that it is ‘contrast spaces’ that attract each other, 
such as a large city and a natural environment (Dienel & al. 2004). Since moving eastwards 
from Szczecin is made difficult by not just the Oder River but also Dąbie Lake (Figure 1), the 
question is whether the city can develop towards the sparsely populated green space across 
the German border. 
 
However, even after the political changes and the gradual opening of the border Szczecin has 
not belonged to Poland’s – let alone Europe’s – centres of development (Dorsch 2003: 74). It 
clearly continues to be a laggard in comparison with similar-sized cities in the western parts 
of the country such as Poznań, Wrocław or Gdańsk, which have been experiencing strong 
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economic growth over the past years. Szczecin usually underperforms in employment rates 
(Polen-Analysen 2011: 9), income comparisons (wB 2010), liveability surveys (wB 2009) and 
other aspects of urban competitiveness such as infrastructure, human and social capital, or 
culture and image (Adekoya 2011). This is also true of the surrounding region: in December 
2003 for instance, West Pomerania was only the ninth biggest FDI-attractor among Poland’s 
sixteen voivodeships (Maack & al. 2005: 15). The GDP of the region was gradually slipping 
below the Polish national average between 2000 and 2010 (Polen-Analysen 2013: 10). In a 
similar vein, West Pomerania’s unemployment rates were constantly higher than in Poland at 
large between 2005 and 2011, while its number of students in higher education was lower in 
the latter year (ibid: 9). For a long time the Szczecin area has seen too few investments (see in 
3.2), not least into housing, which is consequently fairly expensive while of mixed quality. An 
interesting aftereffect of this is that Szczecin tenants as well as investors started to look for 
real-estates across the border (Paper IV). Yet in economic terms at least the Polish side has a 
limited attraction for Germans especially from the direct neighbourhood, among whom few 
are potential (major) investors or employees, due to limited financial opportunities, low wages 
and language difficulties. 
 
The German side can even more explicitly be described as an economic depression region, 
with the north-eastern counties (Kreise) of the federation suffering of rather severe structural 
weaknesses (Maack & al. 2005: 127–176, Reichert-Schick 2010). This impoverished corner 
of Germany is characterised by a rural-agricultural landscape (Reichert-Schick 2010: 157); 
unemployment rates of 17–23% (ibid: 161); emigration rates of up to 50% since reunification, 
with an over-representation of the young and skilled (ibid: 157); and a high degree of political 
extremism – the far right has a stable representation in both regional and municipal authorities 
(see in Paper IV). The area’s structural weaknesses29 are only to some extent counterbalanced 
by the comparatively still important federal system of wealth redistribution, the long-term 
welfare-creating potential of which has anyway been questioned (Wüllenweber 2002). More 
recently, it has even been suggested that the area’s depopulation – which is anyway difficult 
to stop – should be used as a chance, for instance for the environment (Chr. Westphal cited by 
Wiegand 2011). In a similar vein, the gradually emptying eastern states are deemed to have a 
key role in Germany’s Energy transition, for windmills, biomass-based energy, etc. (Bajczuk 
2013). 
 
When it comes to human-to-human contacts, until very recently the boundary at stake could 
be characterised as one of the sharpest dividing lines in Europe regarding ethnicity, language, 
and religion. This could be interpreted in a way that there are few push or pull factors for the 
two sides to engage in cross-border contacts. Unlike in much of Central and Eastern Europe, 
up until recently there were hardly any kin or ethnic ties across the border. Moreover, the far 
right is deeply rooted especially on the German side and, unlike elsewhere in Germany, local 
sentiments are here mostly targeted against the directly neighbouring country – i.e. Poland30. 
My results (see Paper IV) are comparable to Krajewski’s (2011), according to which 21% of 
                                                 
29
 Paper I deals in greater detail with the structural characteristics of both sides. 
30
 In western Germany and in Berlin, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and other xenophobic 
actors usually point out immigrants from Turkey and Muslim countries as the Other. 
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Germans in the former Uecker-Randow district find it “bad” or “very bad” that more Polish 
citizens live in the area since Poland joined the EU. Further, 18.4% in the same group have 
the opinion that German-Polish relations worsened during the same period (ibid). 
 
Since Germany lifted its transitory restrictions on labour from the new EU Member States 
including Poland in May 2011 flows are reported to be increasing, even though no large-scale 
influx of labour has so far been observed at least in the border areas: the number of Poles on 
the German side was recently estimated at 10,000 (MOZ 2013). More illustratively, the three 
German states along the Polish border, with their combined population of over 8 million, have 
just as many Polish citizens as Hamburg alone (ibid) – a city of 1.8 million inhabitants. The 
size of Berlin’s Polish community is proportionate to Hamburg’s (ibid). 
 
What then is so specific about borderlands? This is a question we turn to in the next chapter. 
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4 Borders 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, three different angles will be presented towards the problem of boundaries. 
Rather than being competing approaches I tend to see them as complementary. While I hardly 
claim to cover all perspectives of border studies here, the approaches presented have certainly 
been among the most influential ones in the field and in my work. 
 
 
4.1 The classic approach: the border as a barrier 
 
Border studies, or limology
31
, have until recently largely concerned themselves with physical 
borders and their effects (Lundén 1973, Süli-Zakar 1991). Borders have been observed to 
impact upon such a wide range of areas as population development, identity, and everyday 
life (Forsberg & al. 2006); legal-administrative structures (Paper I, Soós & Fejes 2009); 
spatial planning and regional policy (Papers II and III); migration and livelihood (van Houtum 
2010); dwelling and commuting (Gielis 2009, Paper IV); shopping and consumption (see 
4.2.2) and so on. 
 
4.1.1. The border’s effects on functional integration 
 
A phenomenon characteristic of border areas – especially international, but to a lesser extent 
also sub-national – is their relative marginal position vis-á-vis the centre within a hierarchical 
territorial system. This is especially true in an economic, but in some cases also socio-political 
sense. There are many examples of lagging borderlands, with some European examples being 
the western and eastern (Balogh forthc.) extremes of Poland, northern Scandinavia (Dubois 
2013), eastern Slovakia, or the northeast of Hungary. What these areas have in common is a 
relatively low level of socio-economic integration into their respective national systems and 
especially into their direct neighbourhood across the border. Capitals and key centres of 
economic and political activity are rarely concentrated in a state’s territorial periphery32, and 
where they are, this is either an adaptation to important natural conditions (such as proximity 
to natural resources) or a legacy of historical border shifts (e.g. Copenhagen, Berlin, Vienna, 
Budapest). 
 
Major public investments are rarely made at the border, as these are meant to benefit mostly 
those taxpayers from whose money they are realised. True, with the rise of private actors and 
                                                 
31
 This term is derived from Latin’s limes, meaning border (Kolossov 2006: 15), but is much less often used than 
the denomination ‘border studies’. 
32
 The term periphery can of course not just refer to borderlands but to economically lagging regions in general, 
irrespectively of their physical location within a system (Flint & Taylor 2007, cf. Lang 2012). At the same time, 
borderlands are often peripheries in both senses (see e.g. Soós & Fejes 2009). 
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a common European economic space a project’s funding can be more diverse, but EU sources 
are still tiny (between one and two percent of the national budgets of the Member States). As 
a kind of counterbalancing measure, EU programs such as Interreg are targeting exactly those 
territories that territorial states less often do – i.e. borderlands. 
 
When states do make substantial investments in their territorial peripheries, this is often a 
strategic choice to strengthen their legitimacy in what can be regions of multiple orientations 
or loyalties. As Lundén (2004: 85) noticed, “[e]stablishments in border areas are often 
subsidised by government money with the intention of supporting its weak economy”; 
however, “[t]he effect of this can be that the enterprise becomes dependent on the core area of 
the country without any utilisation of the advantages connected with boundary location” 
(ibid). Illustrative here is the recent wave of relocating public institutions in Sweden from the 
capital to the country’s peripheral regions (such as Gotland and Norrland). Such investments 
are crucial on the local level for creating jobs, but at the same time they serve to strengthen 
the dependence, links, and loyalties of these regions to the Swedish state. The Russian state is 
much more explicitly paying a special attention to its peripheries
33
. A few decades earlier, in 
the Pamirs “[t]he Soviet system showed an absolute commitment to supply this geopolitically 
important region in order to maintain the population’s loyalty” (Kraudzun 2012: 188). When 
Belgium and the German Customs Union were being established in the 1830s, the Dutch 
province Limburg considered joining one of those new entities, in order not to lose the 
economic hinterland of its collieries (Ehlers 2007: 63). During this period, the Dutch Queen 
personally paid a successful visit to the province in order to strengthen the local population’s 
loyalty to the Netherlands. The traditionally paternalistic attitude of the centre vis-á-vis the 
periphery is nicely captured in two fragments of a mid-nineteenth century Chinese poem
34
: 
 
The capital is established near Zhong Mountain; 
The palaces and thresholds are brilliant and shining; 
The forests and gardens are fragrant and flourishing; 
Epidendrums and cassia complement each other in beauty. 
… 
The uncivilized and border people offer tribute, 
And all the barbarians are submissive. 
No matter how vast the territory, 
All will be eventually under our rule. 
Hong Xiuquan 
 
In Germany, the large post-reunification transfers from west to east that mostly went into 
gentrification projects more than long-term job-creating activities have been criticised to 
strengthen centre-periphery relations (Wüllenweber 2002, BPB 2013). In Poland, upon his 
visit to border town Świnoujście (Figure 5) former Polish premier Kaczyński reaffirmed his 
commitment to build a tunnel between the city and the rest of the country (PAP 2007). 
 
                                                 
33
 Russian leaders are commonly reassuring their commitments to the federation’s contested peripheries, such as 
the Kuril Islands (Barry 2010), the Kaliningrad province (Wolffsen & Sergounin 2004: 36), or northern Caucasia 
(Ludwig 2011). 
34
 The whole English version of the poem is cited by Castells (2004: 5). 
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Figure 5. The central parts of Świnoujście are located on the island of Uznam/Usedom, itself divided 
by the Polish-German border (dark green line). Possibly related to the conflict around the shipping 
channel, this Polish postcard indicates the maritime border somewhat questionably. 
 
 
 
Source: author’s photo, July 2009 
 
In some cases, key investments with unattractive concomitant attributes such as pollution or 
noise are made on the fringes of the state. According to Lundén (2004: 86), 
 
“[w]ith a more malevolent interpretation, this type of location can be interpreted as a will to reduce 
domestic effects of environmentally dangerous pollution. This type of arguments have been used 
against the nuclear plant of Barsebäck in Sweden close to Copenhagen, and Cattenom in Lorraine 
(Lotharingia), France close to Germany and Luxembourg.” 
 
In a similar vein, the closure of the Swedish nuclear plant in Barsebäck in 2005 followed 
protests by Denmark (Storm 2010: 11). It may be no coincidence that most of the permanent 
repositories for nuclear waste in Switzerland were proposed to be built directly at its border to 
Germany (Rauner 2010). Moreover, they were first planned to be placed in the central part of 
the country, but as the cantonal referendum there voted against the decision-making was lifted 
to the federal level, where the border locations were proposed (ibid). Elsewhere, Austrian 
plans to construct an incinerator just seven kilometres away from the Hungarian border town 
Szentgotthárd were only abandoned after seven years of protests (Nyugat.hu 2012). In Poland, 
the initially proposed location of the country’s first-ever nuclear power plant was right at the 
German border (at Gryfino), and was only reconsidered after German concerns (Larouche 
PAC 2011). On the other hand, the new Russian-German gas pipeline Nord Stream – which 
circumvents the Baltic states and Poland – ends up near Greifswald (Figure 1), just about fifty 
kilometres from the Polish border. This has angered Poland, which proposed to Germany to 
dig the pipeline under the Baltic seabed due to fears that the shipping channel off the coast of 
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Świnoujście (Figure 5) will be hindered from hosting larger vessels in the future (Gnauck 
2010). It is in the light of this background that the recently finished construction of an LNG-
terminal at Świnoujście for Qatari imports (see in Paper II) can be seen. 
 
A relative neglect of borderlands was observed on the part of private actors as well. Van 
Houtum (1998) studied enterprises in the border areas of the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium, a densely populated region where language and cultural regions do not coincide 
with the state boundary, and where customs and state regulations do not strongly differ. Still, 
almost all these companies were strongly directed towards the domestic market (ibid). Lundén 
explains such behaviour with that “states with a liberal economy but regulated foreign trade 
surrounded by the same type of states tend to disfavour locations at the boundary” (2004: 84). 
 
Lundén has offered a model to explain the border dilemma (Figure 6). This shows that most 
administrative-territorial systems are hierarchical, with political units on lower levels (e.g. 
municipalities) often being subordinated to those at higher levels (e.g. the state). Any local 
issue – such as a natural disaster or the need of an infrastructural investment – that the local 
administration lacks competences or resources to solve thus has to move higher and higher up 
the hierarchy, with the risk of being de-prioritised. When a problem arises in a territorial 
periphery it is often even more remote for decision-makers in the regional or the national 
capital, which is even more the case should the issue go beyond the borders of the territory 
under their responsibility. There is yet another twist when – as is often the case – the 
competences of the administrative units on the two sides of the border do not match, like 
between Germany and Poland (Paper I).
35
 This was a problem for instance when establishing 
the above mentioned European University Viadrina, although as that and other examples here 
show, such obstacles can be overcome if there are enough will and means there (Fichter-Wolf 
& Knorr-Siedow 2009). 
 
Figure 6. Hierarchical asymmetry: the political treatment of a local trans-boundary problem from the 
local (bottom) to the European Union (top). 
 
Source: Lundén (2009: 135) 
                                                 
35
 For Lundén’s own explanation of his original model see Lundén (1973: 188–191); for the developed version 
that is represented here see Lundén (2009: 135–136). 
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Recent deregulation and rescaling of the state (Brenner 2004) may to a certain level alleviate 
this problem of the ‘territorial trap’ whereby the state functions as the primary ‘container’ of 
society (Agnew 1994), and facilitate Szczecin’s development towards a regional cross-border 
centre as is the case with some other European cities (see 2.4 and 4.2.3). Such a direction is to 
some extent evidenced by increased cross-border movements in a few areas. The largest 
phenomenon is arguably that of cross-border residential mobility between Szczecin and the 
villages on the German side (Paper IV). Apart of some additional border-shopping, another 
group of new cross-border flows is not within the borderland, but between Szczecin and 
Berlin. This especially concerns the latter’s importance as a transport hub for Szczecin, which 
despite having its own international airport is linked with Berlin through direct minibus-
connections, scheduled nearly every hour by several companies (Figure 7). That such a new 
cross-border thinking has a long way to get established beyond some alert locals can be 
illustrated by the travel choice of the participants of an international conference in Szczecin, 
which our research team attended in November 2010. In order to visit the event, most 
participants arrived to Szczecin through Warsaw rather than via Berlin: “Since the conference 
is taking place in a Polish city, we have to travel through Warsaw” – they thought. 
 
Figure 7. Over the past years, people in Szczecin have increasingly been using Berlin’s airports (here 
Tegel) in addition to the closer but smaller one at Goleniów. 
 
 
 
Source: author’s photo, July 2009 
 
Hence, cross-border flows are still below their potentials. In its attempt to make journeys to 
Poland more attractive, the transport association of Berlin-Brandenburg offers train tickets to 
Szczecin for ten euros (Höck 2011) – i.e. well below the average price of a comparable trip 
within Germany. Still, the connection appeared to be relatively unexploited during the number 
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of occasions that our research team used it. Clearly, then, cross-border contacts do not just 
depend on the physical structures at hand. Thus I was increasingly turning towards alternative 
approaches attempting to explain border behaviour. 
 
4.1.2 The border’s impact on identities 
 
It was mentioned in the beginning of this sub-chapter that borders also have an impact on 
identities. These tend to be more accentuated in a border situation, with at least two quite 
different scenarios (Balogh 2010)
36
. The border of a country can be a site where displays of 
nationalism are intensified to consolidate the territorial state; alternatively, or simultaneously, 
borderlands can be zones of cultural overlap where the national identity and loyalties of the 
people often become blurred (Johnston & al. 2000: 50)
37
. 
 
The German-Polish borderland is rather illustrative of accentuated attitudes and identities. My 
case study (Paper IV) showed a stronger polarisation especially among local German attitudes 
towards the Poles than is reported in country-wide opinion surveys (see 3.1.2). This may have 
historical-geographical roots. East Prussia, for centuries an eastern ‘outpost of Germandom’, 
was also rather conservative and patriotic (cf. Egremont 2011). In the interwar period, the then 
still German Province of Pomerania found itself in a similar situation. Following World War 
II most Germans were relocated from both of these provinces (see 3.2) not least to what is 
today’s northeastern Germany. To a limited extent this culture lingers on, especially among 
expellee organisations (cf. Kossert 2008).
38
 At the same time some nostalgia towards the 
GDR-times is still present (see in Paper IV), but we should not forget that relations between 
East Germans and Poles were far from frictionless (see 3.1.1 and 3.2). 
 
Similar attitudes can be traced on the Polish side of the border. According to a scholar I talked 
with in Szczecin (Dutkowski 2009), the identities of the local population along the German 
border (especially in the Lubusz Voivodeship) are rather polarised, characterised by either 
nationalistic or a kind of “(post-)socialist” attitude. Both can to some extent be explained by 
the experiences of the post-war population resettlements. On the one hand, some of the local 
borderlanders still fought for the “new” border themselves, and many descend from such 
persons. These “pioneers” moved to the borderland to strengthen its legitimacy (see 3.2). On 
the other hand, many of the new inhabitants also became loyal towards the new socialist 
regime
39
, which – given its commitment during its entire existence to maintain its borders – 
they saw as the guarantor of their new homeland. 
 
It is also important that after 1989, many actors active in the borderland came from western 
Germany. In the 1990s, the Minister of Economy of Brandenburg complained that his state’s 
industry “was being increasingly directed from outside the region” (i.e. by firms from western 
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 Please consult this article for examples. 
37
 For references to various case studies to each of these scenarios, please consult this entry. 
38
 The whole situation with the border shifts, accentuated identities and expellees is very comparable to Trieste 
and the Julian lands. See e.g. Bialasiewicz & Minca (2010). 
39
 This development is very comparable to the Czechoslovak situation in the former German lands; see e.g. von 
Arburg (2009). 
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Germany) and that his ministry “can scarcely be said to have any regional responsibility on its 
own soil” (Krätke 1996: 659). Such statements reflect the apathy that emerged when the 
borderland’s structural weaknesses became even more apparent after Germany’s reunification 
and the introduction of a market economy in the eastern states. More recent examples include 
the main head behind the earlier mentioned Nowa Amerika – an artistic project of German-
Polish reconciliation –, who is similarly from western Germany, as is a real-estate agent in 
Świnoujście whom our research team interviewed. The list goes on with second-home owners 
coming from Hamburg and Berlin, as well as from central Poland and other countries (see in 
Paper IV). It is of course hardly negative that people from outside invigorate our poor and 
sparsely populated study area – finding out whether and how that happens was the aim of our 
project. The point is to show that external actors have a disproportional share in that process. 
Yet another illustration of this observation is the geographical origin of the participants of a 
summer university on the German-Polish-Czech border that I attended in September 2013. 
Very few people took part in this fully open event from the universities in the borderlands 
(there are several) that we studied. In spite of a predominance of German participants, there 
was no-one from eastern Germany. Similarly, the Polish participants came from central 
Poland, and the Czech ones from Prague. Of course this situation reflects centre-periphery 
relations in these countries more generally, but it is noteworthy that these are characteristic 
even in situations where there are good and subsidised opportunities of active participation. 
 
 
4.2 From ‘the border as a barrier’ to ‘the border as a resource’ 
 
Border studies experienced a renaissance in the 1990s and interest has only increased ever 
since. Whereas the field was some time ago criticised for being atheoretical, considerable 
attempts at conceptualisations have been made over the past years (Anderson 2001, Newman 
2003, Brunet-Jailly 2005, Rumford 2006, Konrad & Nicol 2011). Other scholars are more 
critical of the plausibility of a general border theory (Paasi 2009: 222, Pásztor 2013), not so 
much because each border is complex and unique but  
 
rather because of the complexity of borders and bordering. Borders manifest themselves in 
innumerable ways in daily lives and state-related practices and in institutions such as language, 
culture, myths, heritage, politics, legislation and economy. These practices condense in the contested 
idea of citizenship that brings together state, power, control, social responsibilities and possibilities. 
This implies that borders can be theorized reasonably only as part of wider production and 
reproduction of territoriality/territory, state power, and agency. (Paasi 2011: 62) 
 
Comprehensive accounts of developments in border studies have been provided elsewhere 
(Kolossov 2006, Scott 2008, Paasi 2009, Diener & Hagen 2009, Liikanen 2010), but a brief 
general overview is necessary here. So why has there been an upsurge in border studies over 
the past two decades? According to O’Dowd (2002: 29–30), 
 
[t]he period between 1950 and the late 1980s marked the high point of stable, sharply demarcated 
borders… Borders here effectively functioned as barriers behind which relatively inclusive welfare 
states were created. Since then, the globalization of economies, the evolution of European 
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integration, the revolution in mass communications and information technology, the spread of 
regionalization in Europe and the fragmentation induced by the end of the Cold War has 
reconfigured state borders and changed their functions. 
 
On a metatheoretical level, the field can be said to have been emerging as a counter-narrative 
to notions of a borderless world that have been advanced as part of globalisation theory and 
some postmodern ideas (Newman and Paasi 1998: 198–200, Newman 2006). Some believed 
that economic globalisation will lead to a borderless, post-national world (Ohmae 1995, 
Strange 1996, Appadurai 2003), while others emphasised the historical contingency of the 
state (Hobden 1999: 267–268). Some then focused on the emergence of cosmopolitanism 
(Cheah & Robinson 1998, Vertovec & Cohen 2002, Beck 2002) and other ideas challenging 
the territorial state. 
 
Yet few are today clinging to the ‘end of history’ thesis declaring a definite victory of liberal 
democracies that Fukuyama (1992) optimistically projected after the end of the Cold War. 
Some even suggest that we are experiencing the ‘end of the end of history’ (Gat 2007), in 
light of the resurgence of power rivalry and (semi)authoritarianism. The dominant ontological 
position in border studies is well-described by Gielis (2009: 603): 
 
contemporary border scholars … endorse the importance of difference in present-day life. One might 
say that they have the … ontological position in the globalisation debate … that (national) 
differences are still important in this globalisation era… By doing so, they position themselves 
against scholars who claim that we live in a cosmopolitan world where differences and (b)orders 
(should) disappear (Beck 2006). People who move to another country are not borderless people who 
live beyond the (b)orders of nations, in a liquid world (Bauman 2000). Rather they are people who 
live in-between the current and the former country of residence and, by doing so, continuously 
experience the difference between here and there. 
 
The single most important contribution of recent border studies is arguably that it has moved 
the discussion from a disappearance to a transformation of borders. This entails at least three 
key aspects. One, borders have not withered away in the winds of globalisation as suggested 
by some writers mentioned above
40
. On the one hand, a largely unrestricted mobility remains 
a feature of the Schengen countries, with most other borders of the world remaining closed or 
semi-permeable. Perhaps most dramatically, even since the fall of the Berlin Wall, new and 
similar walls have been built along at least three different borders of the world (Jones 2012). 
But even in regions where physical borders have become open, they tend to survive in 
memories and narratives (Newman 2006: 152), of which not least the local borderlanders are 
reminded by monuments (Asher & Jańczak 2007, Lundén 2011a), souvenirs41 (Figure 8), arts 
(Amilhat-Szary 2012), or theater performances (Prokkola 2008). Borders are represented by 
ways of popular culture such as films (Nava 2006, Holm 2011) and television series (Sík 
1993–2001). Historical experiences – like (attempts at) desertion across previously strictly 
controlled demarcation lines such as the former Iron Curtain (Sallai 2012) – can today be “re-
experienced” in performances of border theme parks, such as at the one near Bildein, Austria 
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 See more of this discussion in Paper IV. 
41
 One of the best examples is Berlin, where one can even buy a small piece of the former wall to take home. 
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(Nyugat.hu 2011). Elsewhere, such events are commemorated and discussed at memorial sites 
– for example near Geisa, Germany (PAF 2013). On the Polish side of the study area, the 
Battle of Cedynia mentioned in sub-chapter 3.1.1 is still annually re-enacted on the original 
spot as a spectacle by amateur actors (ZPKWZ 2014). 
 
Figure 8. A seemingly “innocent” piece of souvenir, this kitchen magnet reminds and reinforces our 
understanding of where Szczecin belongs: despite its location in the northwestern extreme of Poland 
right at the German border, the city is here solely associated with the entire territory of the Polish state. 
 
 
Source: author’s photo, January 2010 
 
Second, borders have expanded or ‘thickened’ to be present not just at the edges of territories 
but in all other kinds of spaces, due to advancements in technology (so-called ‘smart borders’, 
surveillance, etc.) and other changes. This element has a large literature on its own but is one 
that I, in order to keep the focus, chose not to intervene in here. 
 
The third but far from less important aspect deals with a significant change in our perception 
of borders, and is one that I will devote more space to. As we saw in the previous sub-chapter, 
early studies mostly looked at the border as a barrier to mobility, information etc. (Reynolds 
& McNulty 1968, Lundén 1973). In the 1990s, the dominant idea was that of a “cessation of 
borders” (Noelle-Neumann & Herdegen 1990: 284, Süli-Zakar 1991) or at least “overcoming 
borders” (Ratti 1993, van Houtum 2000, Schultz 2001), and such notions are still present in 
policy discourses (Brown 2003, AFM 2007), not least in Germany but also in Poland 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2010, Land Brandenburg 2008)
42
. 
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 The related discourses of the ”growing together of Europe” (Buske 2000, BVBS n.a.), or even of the 
”unification of Europe” (Senate of Berlin 2003: 2, Ischinger & al. 2011, Thum 2013) are similarly strong in 
Germany. 
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More recently, an important shift has been taking place in our understanding of borders, with 
a growing number of studies emphasising not just their role as dividing lines but also as 
resources. According to O’Dowd (2002: 14) for instance, “[a]ll borders serve simultaneously 
as barriers, bridges, resources and symbols of identity even if some dimensions appear more 
salient than others depending on the issue or context”. This resonates with the discussion that 
“[b]oundaries not only separate groups and communities from each other but also mediate 
contacts between them” (Newman & Paasi 1998: 194). In its dividing and linking role (Soós 
& Fejes 2009: 19), the border is “both a barrier and a place of contact” (Prokkola 2008: 657). 
 
4.2.1 The border as a resource for bureaucracies and multinational companies 
 
The border has been noted to be a resource for a large variety of actors in society, some of 
which are very powerful: 
 
transnational investors … use borders to take advantage of better investment conditions such as 
government subsidies, lax environmental regulations, cheap labour or a surplus of trained workers. 
While transnational corporations may be keen to diminish the barrier role of borders in one sphere, 
they may favour consolidating it in another sphere. Media multinationals, for example, do not wish 
borders to be a barrier to the transnational ownership of television stations and newspapers, but, on 
the other hand, their sales benefit from serving and even protecting national markets. Maximizing 
their control in segmented, ‘national’ markets may mean utilizing, and even defending, ethnic, 
linguistic and national borders. Thus, they oppose transnational or supranational forms of regulation 
while benefiting from insulated national markets. [Further, borders] necessarily demarcate state 
bureaucracies, voluntary sectors and professional organizations which retain a vested interest in 
maintaining a territorial monopoly. (O’Dowd 2002: 25–26) 
 
Consequently, and due to the rise of new technological tools that help to demarcate territory 
such as GPS, states and other political entities are investing large amounts of resources into 
guarding and (re)defining lands and waters they claim
43
. The resolution of such conflicts often 
involves resource-intensive legal and professional expertise, provided by for instance the 
International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) in Durham. 
 
It has more recently been emphasised that even the neo-liberal state has a vested interest in 
“efficiently” guarding its borders, in order to selectively keep out “undesired” subjects and 
welcome those who can contribute to the national economy (Prokkola 2012). Relatedly, 
nations are increasingly commercialised and branded as products to promote investments, 
tourism, etc. (Volcic & Andrejevic 2011). 
 
If one is to summarise the most important reasons for why territorial state borders are most 
likely to stay with us, they are probably captured in this sub-section. While we are witnessing 
a slow trend towards increased international – but more recently again also national – 
regulation, the logic of competition implies that capital needs different political entities to 
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 A U.S. Department of State webpage links to documents examining coastal states’ maritime claims and/or 
boundaries, assessing their consistency with international law: http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/c16065.htm  
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play off against each other. Relatedly, Belina (2013) recently showed that even the crises of 
capitalism are portrayed by elites as crises of the nation. 
 
4.2.2 The border as a resource in the livelihoods of local borderlanders 
 
A wide range of various actors at the border make their livelihood from its presence, through 
legal, illegal, and semi-legal activities. Among the last two, smuggling has probably received 
most scholarly attention (Sidaway 2002: 153–155, Prokkola 2008, Rogova 2009: 34–36, 
Wagner & Łukowski 2010, Bruns & Miggelbrink 2012). Interestingly, the illegal or semi-
legal nature of cross-border petty trade is (perceived to be) relative, not just by local citizens 
but to a certain degree even by bureaucracies
44
. On the one hand, informal economic activities 
are tolerated by some local administrations since they alleviate social pressures (Wagner & 
Łukowski 2010). On the other hand “[p]ublic opinion does not always condemn (small-scale) 
smuggling, as it is not understood as an offence against individuals and personal property…” 
(Prokkola 2008: 661). This is probably less the case with other forms of (organised) crime 
crossing borders such as drug trade, trafficking (of humans, arms etc.), money laundering, 
contract killing, and kidnapping (Cornell & Swanström 2006). 
 
But borders offer many legal opportunities for the little guy as well, the most directly visible 
of which implying the sales of goods and services to cross-border travellers, including those 
who come to the border (because of the same exchange rate and tariff differentials that drive 
smuggling) to shop, to purchase or consume something that is cheaper “on the other side” 
(Sidaway 2002: 154). Lundén (2004: 92) observed that 
 
[a]long the boundaries of the states of Europe, and in many other states in the world, there is a 
special ‘cultural landscape’ of supply points for cross-boundary purchases. The types of sought-after 
goods and services differ from boundary to boundary, of course, but there is still much in common. 
Supply points are located as close to the boundary as possible, along the main highways. Shops often 
have an ‘occasional’ look; advertisements are large and aggressive. The goods are often liquor, 
[tobacco,] certain types of food, sometimes electronics. The language of the neighbouring state is 
used, and its currency is of course accepted. Beyond the ‘pure’ boundary products there is also a 
supply of all sorts of low quality products from stalls and kiosks and of course fast food, drinks and 
candy. 
 
While such activities usually require an at least partially open border (Paasi & Prokkola 2008: 
19, Rogova 2009: 34, Laine 2012: 69), even one of the  most strongly controlled borderlands 
in the world – between North and South Korea (Kim 2012) – hosts at least a special economic 
zone for cross-border labour and some opportunities for shopping. The Polish-German bor-
derland has been particularly famous for border bazaars (O’Dowd 2002: 25). According to a 
local academic (Dutkowski 2009), despite West Pomerania’s status as a peripheral part of 
Poland many people have been benefitting from the border location by maintaining small-
scale, legal or illegal economic activities across the border (cf. Ładykowska & Ładykowski 
2013). 
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 And here I avoid the discussion on (local) elites themselves being involved in illegal cross-border trade. 
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Borderlands and even the borders themselves can be tourist attractions, with their relicts, 
monuments, natural parks, welcome centres, gambling, and so on (Timothy 1995). These in 
turn can attract hotels, bars, cafés, shops, restaurants, and currency changers (Sidaway 2002: 
154). Perhaps as a sort of “catastrophe tourism”, the Berlin Wall was and its few remnants – 
and all the museums and other attractions around it – still are among the most important sights 
that tourists are visiting. Other examples include the former Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) in 
Vietnam, or the still existing one between North and South Korea (Kim 2012). 
 
Thus borders can of course not just constitute a resource in Europe – where they are more 
permeable – but also in Africa (Feyissa & Höhne 2010, Doevenspeck 2011: 138–140), Asia 
(van Schendel 2001: 409–412, Kraudzun 2012), and elsewhere. Some of the opportunities 
offered by it might even be more important in parts of those regions, given the dire socio-
economic circumstances in which many local borderlanders find themselves. At the same time 
– just as most theories – also the narrative of ‘the border as a resource’ has its shortcomings, 
with several studies emphasising that it is often only a few people benefitting (Kraudzun 
2012, Müller 2013: 197, Rogova 2009: 40). In his study on the Pamirs, Kraudzun (2012: 189) 
noted that “only traders well-equipped with resources and connections as well as the border 
officials can use the border as a resource. The majority of the population has to pay the higher 
prices…” Last but not least, the advantages of the border are often (perceived to be) larger on 
one or the other side (Hayward 2006: 2, Paasi & Prokkola 2008: 27)
45
. 
 
In sum, then, the border acquires a meaning that differs from its original function: it becomes 
the most important resource for local economies that had previously been disadvantaged by 
being located at the territorial periphery (Wagner & Łukowski 2010). Thus rather than erasing 
it, smuggling and trade across the border re-inscribe liminality and regulation as a local 
resource (Sidaway 2002: 153). 
 
But while these various (small-scale) cross-border economic activities are crucial for the 
livelihood of local borderlanders (Müller 2013, Rogova 2009: 34, Prokkola 2008: 670), they 
are undergoing significant decline as a result of the “integration” and “harmonisation” of 
European space (Sidaway 2002: 153–154). Some even go as far as to suggest that “cross-
border integration (e.g. in the form of regional ‘homogenisation’) could coincide with 
decreasing cross-border mobility” (Spierings & van der Velde 2008: 497). Along the Spanish-
Portuguese border for instance, an entire industry of passage has been suffering from the 
building of a bridge and access roads that bypass the border-towns (Sidaway 2002: 154–155, 
de Fátima Amante 2013: 38). This can be compared with our study area, where the benefits of 
a new motorway connecting Szczecin and Hamburg have been questioned for the settlements 
lying in-between (Kirbach 2006). 
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4.2.3 The border as a resource for cross-border cooperation 
 
Partly as a compensation for border regions adversely affected by the Single Market, the 
European Commission took serious efforts to support various institutionalised forms of cross-
border cooperation (O’Dowd 2002: 21). These include euroregions (Perkmann 2003), i.e. 
collaboration of adjacent territories on different sides of a border; or town-twinning projects 
(Eskelinen & Kotilainen 2005), whereby also more remote settlements can cooperate. Illust-
rative of the (initial) strong belief in the impact of institutionalised cross-border cooperation is 
a Council of Europe report from the early 1990s, arguing that it would reduce the territorial 
states’ monopoly of control in border regions by constituting “the first step towards political 
union”, and even representing “the cornerstone of the future European political community” 
(Mestre 1992: 14). However, a number of studies (Eskelinen & Kotilainen 2005: 40, Scott & 
Matzeit 2006, Paasi & Prokkola 2008: 21–23, Joenniemi & Sergunin 2012: 39, de Fátima 
Amante 2013: 37–38) have shown that rather than “uniting politically”, the actors involved in 
these formations are turning their (alleged) disadvantage into an advantage by using their 
border location as a resource, not least by attracting EU funds for their undertakings. 
 
At the same time, the presence of a border can offer opportunities beyond the more pragmatic 
elements of fundraising. Sohn and others (2009: 922) have shown that for European border 
cities such as Basel and Geneva, 
 
“the presence of a national border offers an opportunity to invent original forms of governance, to 
increase the autonomy of the local authorities by different types of cooperation which transcend the 
institutional and territorial divides, and to promote the international character of the metropolitan 
centre. In a context of global competition, these features represent an undeniable benefit.” 
 
Thus the idea that “the border unites” or at least interconnects rather than divides is more and 
more present among practitioners (Hubenko 2011: 2, EstLatRus 2013, Renate 2013, Kokovai 
2013). Some of the cross-border cooperation projects co-financed by the EU even run under 
the slogan “united by borders” (EstLatRus 2013). 
 
In our study area, the Euroregion Pomerania appears to be the most important organisation 
dealing with institutionalised cross-border cooperation. While supporting a large number of 
projects and encounters, the Euroregion’s unusually large territory46 perhaps hinders engaging 
some of the included communities in meaningful exchange. It is arguably the development of 
Szczecin and its direct German hinterland that is the crucial issue in this region. However, a 
border-transgressing spatial planning of this increasingly cross-border agglomeration does not 
yet exist, for legal and other reasons (Tölle 2013). The same goes for the Oradea Metropolitan 
Area (OMA 2013) at the Hungarian border in Romania. In both cases, institutionalised 
cooperation has been established between the urban municipality and the surrounding local 
authorities, but not with the ones across the state border. 
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 The Euroregion Pomerania stretches all the way from Båstad (Sweden) in the north to the outskirts of Berlin in 
the south, and from Stralsund in the west to Koszalin in the east. Most euroregions – including all the other three 
along the German-Polish border – have a smaller territory and are thus more concentrated around the border. For 
a short discussion on why Pomerania turned out to be so large, please return to sub-chapter 3.3. 
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4.2.4 The border as a resource for the maintenance of the Other 
 
Finally and partly controversially, in its function as a dividing line separating more or less 
homogenous ethno-linguistic and cultural groups, the border is a resource for those eager to 
sustain these differences. These actors are not necessarily just bureaucracies, big firms, and 
nationalists, regionalists or local patriots, but can compose large segments of the population. 
Doevenspeck (2011: 140) for instance noted the wide “range of accounts of the border, from 
being a desired barrier against the demonized ‘other’ and a means of exclusion” besides its 
conception as a resource. In Laine’s study (2012: 69), “[t]he respondents see the border as a 
resource for interaction and regional development, yet its barrier function is also valued”. This 
is very comparable to the results of my survey (Paper IV), which showed that not just far-right 
voters can embrace the border
47
. The most obvious examples of proponents of (re)installing 
borders can probably be found in newly independent countries (re)gaining independence, for 
instance among the ethnic majority populations in the Baltic states. 
 
Some reasons for this change of perspective from ‘the border as a barrier’ to the ‘border as a 
resource’ have been named in this sub-chapter, but there are more. It comes perhaps from the 
realisation that borders are here to stay (not so much their exact drawing or function but rather 
their mere existence) even in a “globalised” world. As Eskelinen and Kotilainen (2005: 40) 
note in a case study from the Finnish-Russian borderland, “[a]gainst the backdrop of history, 
it could be regarded as a genuinely significant achievement if Imatra and Svetogorsk would 
get their administrative cooperation running, and they could attract new investments into the 
region”. 
 
But the search for conceptualisations on why borders exist beyond the logic of power over 
territory (Sack 1986: 21–34, Lundén 1997, Anderson 2001: 19, Paasi 2009) should not stop 
there. In the last section of this chapter, therefore, we shall see how border studies and the 
even larger literature on the Other have more recently started to mutually enrich each other in 
order to approach a deeper understanding on the creation and maintenance of differences. 
 
 
4.3 Boundaries, nations, and Others 
 
In many ways boundaries are one of the most fundamental elements of social reality. While a 
number of thinkers from Montaigne (1572–74/1958) through Vygotsky (Miller 2002: 372–
418) to various postmodernists noted the fluidity of the boundary between the Self and the 
Other, an essential characteristic of the individual remains the drive to distinguish her/himself 
from others (Freud 1922/1989: 3). Without the Other, there is no Self (cf. Gregory & al. 2009: 
515)
48
. At the same time, as the individual is social in nature (Simmel 1908/2009: 409) and 
dependent on others (de Swaan 2003: 9–11) s/he also has a need to be part of a community, 
group or network. 
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 My results in turn are very comparable to Brym’s (2009), who studied the Polish side of the same area. 
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 For further references on this issue, including G.W.F. Hegel and Jacques Lacan, please consult this entry. 
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For the sake of analysis it is important that “[t]he contrast between individual psychology and 
social or group psychology, which at first glance may seem to be full of significance, loses a 
great deal of its sharpness when it is examined more closely” (Freud 1922/1989: 3). Freud’s 
“psycho-analysis shows that almost every intimate emotional relation between two people 
which lasts for some time – marriage, friendship, the relations between parents and children – 
contains a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility…” (1922/1989: 41–42). Hence, such 
dynamics in the relationship are as valid for groups as for individuals. 
 
The size of a group can of course range from a gathering of three individuals to a community 
of millions; some can theoretically include the whole of mankind, for instance in the form of a 
global awareness or a community of “world citizens”. Yet also groups identify themselves in 
relation to other groups: ‘us’ cannot exist without ‘them’. Moreover, and perhaps somewhat 
paradoxically, even a global or cosmopolitan identity can be exclusive – for instance by not 
accepting the less like-minded. 
 
However, groups are rarely stable and fixed: on the contrary, they are in a more or less 
constant state of flux, regarding both their members and the ideas and goals connecting them. 
Kin, ethnicity, religion, caste, profession, class, gender, race
49
, and nationality are some of the 
dominant identity markers that have worked to define groups of individuals throughout 
history. Among these, nationality has arguably been the most significant in the past two or so 
centuries, at least in Western cultures. It has in fact been such a prevalent form of social 
organisation that its dominance has rarely been questioned, at least among the wider public. 
 
As globalisation theory, new regionalism and other theories stressed in the 1990s, the national 
may have been loosening somewhat. Yet like borders (as we saw in the previous sub-chapter), 
national identities are surprisingly stable in our current age (Castells 2004: 32) – even if this is 
less true of their content than their mere existence. In the past two decades we have even been 
witnessing a revival of nationalism in large parts of the world, interpreted by some as exactly 
a reaction to globalisation (Kaldor 2004, Castells 2004: 33). Somewhat paradoxically then, 
accelerating global flows of goods, persons and images appear to go together with determined 
efforts towards closure, emphasis on cultural difference and fixing of identities (Meyer & 
Geschiere 1999). As with borders (see 4.2), images of national characteristics and stereotypes 
are maintained in popular culture and literature
50
, country travel guides (Jaworski & al. 2011), 
jokes and anecdotes
51
, as well as other communications designed to make us sense of space 
and belonging. Differences between nations and countries are even exaggerated in nation-
branding campaigns (Volcic & Andrejevic 2011) and tourist promotions, to satisfy our thirst 
for the Other and the exotic that we occasionally long after (Löfgren 1990). Further, spatial 
belongings are (re-)constituted by our dependence on and use of institutions and authorities, 
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 The term ‘race’ is of course highly problematic in a European context but is commonly used in North America 
(see e.g. St Louis 2005), where it has a different connotation and is sometimes used interchangeably with 
‘ethnicity’ (Johnston & al. 2009: 215). 
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 One example is the pocket series Xenophobe’s guides; see http://www.xenophobes.com/. 
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 For some Polish and German examples see http://www.polishharmony.de/Witze-ueber-Polen-und-Deutsche.  
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many of which remain nationally organised (see sub-chapter 4.2.1). They are also legitimised 
by geographical and national metanarratives about the origins, presence, and (desired) future 
of the community at stake (Bassin 2012). Moreover, spatial belongings are reproduced by a 
number of conscious and semi-conscious mundane practices, such as the use of flags and 
currencies (Billig 1995). National flags are particularly often waved at the border (Paper IV), 
and different currencies exchanged. Restaurants elsewhere named after localities, regions, or 
given some phantasy names become symbols and transmitters of ‘the national culture’ at the 
border (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. “German Cuisine” and “Restaurant Poland” on each side of the border-crossing Linken/ 
Lubieszyn. 
  
Source: author’s photos, July 2011 
 
Last but far from least, national identities survive in everyday mundane discourses and 
communication (Newman 2006). Illustratively, in Sweden for instance other countries are 
often “blamed” for extreme weather conditions through the use of such terms as ‘Russian 
cold’, ‘German warmth’ or ‘England rain’; explained by people’s willingness to associate 
certain types of weather with a specific place, while reinforcing pre-existing feelings for the 
country at stake (di.se 2013). In the German-Polish borderland, othering discourses remain 
among local residents (Galasińska & Galasiński 2003, Paper IV) and regional elites (Best 
2007, Paper III) alike. 
 
Even without going back to ancient classics, one can find abundant inspiration in works from 
the past two centuries or so that deal with the creation and maintenance of the Other. Among 
literary classics, the famous grandiose dramas of Faust (Goethe 1808/1992) and The Tragedy 
of Man (Madách 1861/2000) raise questions on whether mankind is able to create a long-
standing peaceful society, a (near-)utopian coexistence of all.
52
 Whereas Georg Simmel’s 
(1908/2009) and Alfred Schuetz’s (1944) works on ‘the stranger’ show clear parallels to the 
literature on the Other, the term ‘stranger’ has an arguably different and perhaps more 
negative connotation than the Other. While the former feels more remote, the latter is more 
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 While there is a long-established consensus among social scientists that inter-group conflicts are caused by the 
construction of an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy, a remarkable recent study on macaques by social psychologists 
showed that such biases may be rooted in phylogenetically ancient mechanisms (Mahajan & al. 2011). Of course 
questions do and should remain regarding studies comparing human with non-human behaviour. 
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ambivalent; the Other is not necessarily a stranger, let alone an enemy. Instead, the Other(s) 
may be very well known to ‘us’ but we may nevertheless not be willing or able to identify 
with it/her/him/them. Illustrative here are examples of ethnic groups that have been living 
together – or perhaps rather side by side – for centuries without having become one group, 
such as Baltic peoples and ethnic Russians in the Baltics, or some ethnic Hungarians in the 
neighbouring countries of Hungary
53
. Jews until 1948, Armenians until 1991, or Kurds until 
our days are only some in the plethora of identities that may not have survived without their 
centuries-long maintenance of cultural-ethnic boundaries. The big post-colonial wave of 
discussion on the creation of the Other was activated by Lévi-Strauss’s book Sad Tropics 
(1961) and perhaps even more by Said’s opus Orientalism (1978), in which they describe and 
criticise the exoticisation of non-European cultures by Western travelers and thinkers that 
reaches far back in history. 
 
An influential perspective on processes of othering was offered by Freud, who noticed that  
 
it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well, 
who are engaged in constant feuds and ridiculing each other – like the Spaniards and Portuguese, for 
instance, the North Germans and South Germans, the English and Scotch, and so on. (Freud 1930/ 
1989: 72) 
 
Freud termed this phenomenon ‘the narcissism of minor differences’, which he saw as “a 
convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of 
which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier” (Freud 1922/1989: 
72). The concept has been influential in explaining ethnic (Blok 1998) and social (St Louis 
2005) conflict and differentiation ever since. A good number of ethno-national examples can 
be named from Europe alone: thus the Germans, Austrians, and Swiss (Rack 2012); the Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosnians (Blok 1998: 42–44, Kolstø 2007: 168); the Scandinavians (Dahlerup 
2013); the Czechs and Slovaks; or perhaps the Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians can all 
be regarded as very close. While Kolstø (2007: 167–169) correctly reminds us that this is an 
outsider’s viewpoint and the minor differences may be perceived as large by the respective 
peoples themselves, the references above all show that the emphasis on the minor differences 
between them can be attributed to exactly their smallness. Jacoby (2011) has even suggested 
that we are nowadays witnessing increased tensions and ethno-social differentiation exactly 
because the differences between groups are decreasing universally. As Girard (1979: 51) put 
it, “[i]t is not the differences but the loss of them that gives rise to violence and chaos”. While 
it may be wrong or at least too early to talk of Germans and Poles having become so similar 
that they now need to emphasise their minor differences, there are some signs of such a trend 
in the Szczecin-borderland at least in terms of material wealth and opportunities. In a private 
conversation, an academic with origins on the German side of the border related the growth of 
negative attitudes by local Germans towards the Poles (see Paper IV) to their own minority 
complexes vis-á-vis the rest of Germany, where their region is mostly known for its structural 
weaknesses (see 3.3). This creates a local approach something along the line of “we may have 
problems, but we are still better than the Poles”. 
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 Of course there is always a certain degree of overlap, hybridisation, and even assimilation, but by and large the 
group identities mentioned have been fairly stable (not as much their meaning as their mere existence). 
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At the same time, the Other or even the stranger can also be seen as an enrichment (Vogt & al. 
2010). In his study on the Congolese-Rwandan borderland, Doevenspeck (2011: 140) noted 
that “accounts of the border as a resource, as an opportunity for recreation and as something 
normal and inevitable, show that the mutual exchange embedded in everyday border practices 
at the local level has the potential to contribute to a deconstruction of the official versions of 
otherness.” In a similar vein, Joenniemi and Sergunin (2012: 47) noticed that in Northern 
Europe “[t]he ensuing encounters with previous otherness seem gradually to be on their way 
of being turned into a resource”.54 
 
While processes of othering have hardly disappeared in the Szczecin-borderland, their actual 
target has indeed shifted. Whereas “anti-neighbourness” may have been mainstream a few 
decades ago on both sides, attitudes and politics are today more polarised especially on the 
German but also on the Polish side (see in Paper IV). Thus for people with liberal or leftist 
sympathies for instance the local far right is clearly more of an Other than are like-minded 
Poles, and vice-versa. Nevertheless, these domestic polarisations have far from fully replaced 
the predominance of national identities as the main basis of identification (cf. Brym 2009), 
and can themselves be seen as constituting new-old types of boundaries. 
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 For a further discussion on the link between bordering and othering, see Paper IV and especially van Houtum 
(2010: 959–960). 
53 
 
5 The papers in brief 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, a short outline of each of the four papers that make up the rest of this thesis is 
provided. 
 
 
5.1 Paper I 
 
Lundén, T., Mellbourn, A., von Wedel, J. & Balogh, P. 2009, "Szczecin: A cross-border center of 
conflict and cooperation" in Conflict and cooperation in divided cities, ed. J. Jańczak, Logos Verlag, 
Berlin, pp. 109–121.  
 
The first and co-authored paper analysed the conditions for cross-border contacts in the study 
area, including areas of cooperation as well as conflicting interests. The bulk of the primary 
data is made up by seven (at the time) freshly conducted elite interviews, complemented by 
secondary sources such as earlier studies on the  area as well as newspaper articles. My part 
focused especially on transport infrastructure that is or is planned to cross the border. Our 
common conclusion was that relations between people on the two sides are generally good, 
but not very intensive. On the institutional side, some structural challenges that have been 
working against a closer cooperation include asymmetries in the administrative-hierarchical 
structures between Poland and Germany, implying that competences are different on the same 
administrative-territorial level in the two countries. 
 
 
5.2 Paper II 
 
Balogh, P. forthc., "Changing patterns of city-hinterland relations in Central and East European 
borderlands: Szczecin on the verge of Poland and Germany" in Governance in Transition, eds. A. 
Ryder & J. Buček, Springer. 
 
Accepted in August 2011; last announced date of publication: September 2014. 
See: http://www.springer.com/earth+sciences+and+geography/geology/book/978-94-007-5502-4 
The version presented here is a modified version of the accepted paper. 
 
The second paper attempted to test whether two theoretical approaches, the central place 
theory and the rescaling-theory, can be helpful tools in explaining cross-border developments 
in the study area. The latter were followed through news articles, observations from the field, 
and various communications with local actors (mostly interviews). In conclusion it could be 
said that while both conceptual frameworks were found to have some relevance, none of them 
seems sufficient to explain the local conditions. 
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The paper also includes a small content analysis of a number of official strategy documents. 
While these were produced by various actors on both sides of the border, they all touched 
upon the city of Szczecin’s present and future geopolitical and geo-economic orientations. 
The analysis found that it is not uncommon by actors and experts to explicitly use history and 
geography as a discursive tool to legitimise their policies, at times even if these diverge. Thus 
emphasising different elements of the city’s past experiences could serve in both promoting 
increased cross-border contacts as well as raising an awareness of an over-optimism thereof. 
It is clear that overemphasising the city’s past and contemporary geographic locations bears 
some risks of seeing this cross-border development in deterministic terms. 
 
 
5.3 Paper III 
 
Balogh, P. 2013, "The Outsider Advantage. Interviewing Planners and Other Elites in the Polish-
German Borderland", Journal of Settlements and Spatial Planning, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 101–108.  
 
The third paper is based on the 38 elite interviews our team conducted; their content but also 
the experience of having conducted them in another country. As conducting interviews with 
elites is increasingly common, an important debate emerged around the researcher’s position 
as an insider/outsider also in a geographic sense. Three standpoints have been distinguished. 
Initially, some emphasised the advantages of the insider in eliciting interesting and sometimes 
even sensitive information from informants. More recently, several scholars suggested that 
this position is never stable but shifting between in- and outsider. Our experiences are more in 
line with those who demonstrated the advantages of being an outsider. Coming from outside 
the study area may be particularly helpful when interviewing elites on sensitive issues such as 
contacts in a borderland with a troubled history. Our interviews revealed three patterns. First, 
blaming the other side for a lack of success with cross-border cooperation is not unusual on 
both sides. Second, de-emphasising the importance of cooperation is more common on the 
Polish side, but also occurred on the German side. Finally, a discourse of ‘re-establishing the 
historically coherent region’ is clearly present on the German side, but lacks almost entirely 
on the Polish side. It is doubtful whether we would have been able to elicit such attitudes from 
both studied groups had we come from either of them. 
 
As always, the last point can be challenged to some extent. A few factors could indeed have 
moderated our outsiderness, such as being similarly dressed (in suits) as the interviewees or 
possibly being received by them as elites. We have also undertaken a number of trips to the 
study area, even if these usually lasted for about three days in total. The encounter with the 
respondents was simply too short (usually about one hour in total) to have developed into a 
closer relationship, as has been reported in other cases (Lindelöf 2006: 41). More importantly, 
meeting outsiders – geographically and professionally – means that interviewees have little to 
lose from being straight and open about their experiences. Unlike the German journalist who 
reported on the local interviewees being nerved by yet another visitor (Pergande 2011), we 
truly felt welcome by them and were never really turned down a meeting. 
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5.4 Paper IV 
 
Balogh, P. 2013, "Sleeping abroad but working at home: Cross-border residential mobility between 
transnationalism and (re)bordering", Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, vol. 95, no. 
2, pp. 189–204.  
 
The fourth paper deals with a phenomenon emerging in several borderlands mostly in Europe. 
Cross-border residential mobility (CBRM) is in my study area mostly driven by Szczeciners 
who move to localities in the northeast of Germany but largely commute back to their native 
city on a daily basis, for work and social life. This phenomenon has been treated by scholars 
as another example of transnationalism. The bulk of my empirical study consisted of a survey 
in Vorpommern with Polish and German residents alike, with an option for the respondents to 
comment freely as they wished. This and the fieldwork revealed that rather than overcoming 
the border and leading to new kinds of post-national identities as a number of transnationalists 
have suggested, CBRM in many ways reinforces national structures as it rests on exploiting 
the differences and advantages of different countries. Additionally, cross-border residents are 
in Vorpommern – but also elsewhere – met with mixed feelings by the native community, 
whose (re-)demarcation of the border by alternative means (such as national symbols and 
flags but even anti-neighbour utterances) is more illustrative of ordering, (re-)bordering, and 
othering than processes of hybridisation and transnationality. 
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6 Concluding discussion 
 
 
 
 
Those who make a practice of comparing human actions are never so  
perplexed as when they try to see them as a whole and in the same light;  
for they commonly contradict each other so strangely that it seems 
impossible that they have come from the same shop. 
 
Montaigne (1572–74/1958: 239) 
 
 
While some important cross-border developments have been taking shape in the Szczecin area 
of the German-Polish borderland over the past years, social and economic life remain strongly 
influenced by the presence of the state border. 
 
Whereas a few border-transgressing processes were triggered by the partial opening of the 
border in 1989–1990, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and of the Schengen Area in 2007 
were clearly milestones in this development, carrying a number of opportunities for these 
largely peripheral regions. Some of those opportunities have been more successfully exploited 
than others. It may not be too surprising that the German-Polish borderland has not come very 
close to earlier, rather over-ambitious visions such as the ‘Stolpe-Plan’, the ‘Oder region’, or 
suggestions of a number of regions crisscrossing the border, centred around the larger cities or 
‘central places’ (Ciok 2009, see also in Papers I and II). Taking into account Szczecin’s large 
size one cannot so far talk of a particularly dynamic cross-border agglomeration in a current 
European comparison either. With its connections to the direct German hinterland remaining 
scarce, the city is rather unlikely to become the next booming cross-border metropolis á la 
Bratislava – let alone Basel, Geneva, or Luxembourg. Yet with growing transportation and 
commercial links to Berlin and its airports, it is more comparable with Oradea, a city that has 
been developing connections to Budapest and its airport as well as some movements with its 
direct hinterland on the Hungarian side of the border, like cross-border residential mobility. 
When it comes to Szczecin’s direct hinterland on the German side of the border, the most 
important development is similarly the cross-border residential mobility of approximately 
three thousand Poles (Paper IV); but as I tried to show, deeper integration effects of that 
process are questionable. For the rest, most elements in the borderland largely remain under 
national – or local but not transborder – structures, including metropolitan governance (Tölle 
2013, Lang 2012) and public transport. I also pointed out that some of the area’s potentials are 
disproportionally taken advantage of or even driven by actors coming from outside, including 
economic opportunities, second home ownership, and cultural-educational exchange. 
 
The developments above – and their partial lack – can on the one hand be explained by the 
study area’s structural weaknesses, such as its socio-economic and demographic challenges. 
Indeed, a scenario is emerging of a borderland left for the environment and for recreational 
functions. This can be compared with von Wedel’s (2010a) suggestion of a re-medievalised 
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border, characterised by marsh and swamp. That would probably matter little for German-
Polish contacts, which are increasingly concentrated in large cities rather than in the direct 
borderland. But such a scenario raises questions of social and economic sustainability not just 
in border but also peripheral areas more generally. 
 
I pointed out that while German-Polish relations on the bi-national level have significantly 
improved, various historical and contemporary experiences have served to create specific 
borderland attitudes and identities that are rather accentuated in the area (Paper IV). Whereas 
encounters with the Other are seen as an enrichment in certain places and contexts (Vogt & al. 
2010), the emerging picture in the study area is a rather polarised one, especially on the 
German side where the Other is now frequently encountered and well-present. But the 
continued significance of the boundary can also be related to the insight whereby borders are 
now widely seen as resources to be exploited rather than barriers to be overcome; by firms, 
bureaucracies (O’Dowd 2002, Scott & Matzeit 2006), and citizens (Sidaway 2002, Laine 
2012) alike. Thus while institutions like the Euroregion Pomerania may be working for cross-
border integration as well as regional or hybrid identities, their legitimacy is based exactly on 
the presence of the border. As in many borderlands where the physical barriers are at least 
partly removed (see in Paper IV), most citizens in the Szczecin area are crossing more and 
more often, but to experience and to take advantage of the differences of both sides (in prices, 
quality etc.) rather than to overcome them. The results are thus in line with other studies that 
point to a continued relevance of boundaries even when the physical barriers are gone and 
flows are increasing (Newman 2006, Paasi & Prokkola 2008, de Fátima Amante 2013). They 
also support Brym’s (2009) findings from the Polish side of the same area. The conclusions 
are also in line with analyses of globalisation that describe it as a seemingly paradoxical and 
simultaneous mixture of opening and closure
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 (Meyer & Geschiere 1999). Such processes 
can also be explained by the logic of competition so accentuated under the conditions of 
global capitalism (O’Dowd 2002: 25–26, Prokkola 2012, Belina 2013) as well as the apparent 
psychological (Freud 1922/1989) and social (de Swaan 2003) need of group belonging by the 
individual. 
 
Yet this contribution does not only point out that the works of border scholars have been more 
adequate than of those who claimed to observe the rise of a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1995, 
Strange 1996, Hobden 1999, Appadurai 2003) in analysing conditions in my study area. The 
contingency of the importance of boundaries and national identities is an equally important 
finding. Thus local German-Polish relations experienced two low-points in the past 25 years; 
the first in 1989–1991 (cf. Mirwaldt 2005), and the second in 2005–2009. Both these periods 
coincide with major changes and also fears (whether perceived or real) related to the gradual 
opening of the border in 1989, 2004, and 2007. It is therefore not impossible, though far from 
obvious, that the border’s importance will overall decrease in the longer run. As we have seen 
empirical evidence is mixed here and further studies need to follow. It is most likely that the 
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 Russia is a particularly good example of a country that throughout its history has shifted between periods of 
opening and closure. Somewhat similarly, Europe has also oscillated between integration and fragmentation and 
there are growing signs that following a relatively long period of increasing cooperation, its countries are again 
turning inwards (cf. Lange & Bijman 2012, Swartz 2012). 
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significance and meaning of boundaries will be fluctuating over time, as they have been in the 
past. Either way, I believe that future border studies will need to take aspects of temporality 
and situatedness more into account when making general statements regarding a resurgence of 
borders
56
, irrespectively of how accurately such analyses reflect the situation in our current 
times. 
 
The logo of the German-Polish secondary school (cover page photo) can be seen to represent 
the relationship between the two nations: it can be likened to the construction of a bridge, the 
outcome of which yet remaining open (Pergande 2011). At least the building has begun. True, 
even once the bridge is completed new and old barriers can be (re-)raised in the forms of tolls, 
limitations on crossing (which also depends on the capacity of the bridge), or other controlling 
mechanisms. Even once all forms of physical, political, or financial hindrances are removed, 
cultural (e.g. mental boundaries), socio-economic, and demographic (e.g. a declining or aging 
population) challenges can remain, as is the case in the Szczecin area. 
 
The dilemma is that while the world is a rich place thanks to its diversity, in order for that 
diversity to flourish boundaries are necessary. Then again, diversity can only be experienced 
by crossing – and not erasing – boundaries. When we travel to another country or place, we 
tend to pay more attention to the differences than to the similarities. We may or may not like 
those differences, but we still make the trip to experience them (cf. Löfgren 1990). Thus the 
question is not anymore whether differences – perceived or real – are there to stay. It is how 
we handle them. 
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 Among the few examples, Newman noted that boundaries become particularly important when “the physical 
borders have been 'removed', or 'opened', and are non-visible. It is at this point where we often delude ourselves 
into believing that we are living in a borderless world when, in effect, some of our more mundane daily life 
practices and activities demonstrate the continued impact of the bordering process on societal norms” (2006: 
152). In ethnic studies, Brubaker (1996) for instance has been more critical of a constant importance of national 
and ethnic identities, emphasising that it is contingent on certain situations and contexts while nearly irrelevant 
in others. 
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Sammanfattning (Swedish summary) 
 
 
 
 
 
Gränsområden är ofta perifera såväl geografiskt-administrativt som ekonomiskt. Ett särskilt 
illustrativt fall är området runt Szczecin mellan Polen och Tyskland där en storstad på ena 
sidan gränsar till ett glesbefolkat omland på den andra. Det finns ett antal liknande fall i 
Europa (Nijmegen, Strasbourg, Basel, Genève, Trieste osv), men studier av dem visar en 
varierande grad av sammanlänkningar efter de fysiska barriärernas bortfall. Inte minst vid 
forskningsprojektets början fanns det få studier av just Szczecinområdet. Det övergripande 
syftet för detta arbete är därmed att analysera hur den fysiska gränsens öppnande påverkar det 
tysk-polska gränsområdet kring staden Szczecin. De mer specifika frågeställningarna är: Hur 
och varför har gränsens öppning påverkat de båda sidorna vad gäller 
 
 gränsöverskridande samarbete, rumslig planering samt regional utveckling? 
 lokala och regionala beslutsfattares diskurser, åtgärder och ageranden? 
 tyska och polska lokalinvånares attityder gentemot varandra och gentemot gränsen? 
 
En sekundär frågeställning är om inställningen bland tyskar och polacker gentemot varandra 
längs gränsen i studieområdet skiljer sig från inställningen i de två länderna i stort. Arbetet är 
en sammanläggningsavhandling där dessa teman har undersökts genom diverse metoder i 
olika studier. ’Kappan’ försöker svara på de ovan nämnda frågorna genom att 
 
 presentera utvecklingen i studieområdet, historiskt men med fokus från 1989, 
 presentera de teoretiska verktygen, och 
 baka ihop resultaten från de självständiga studierna med ytterligare empiriskt bevis. 
 
Jag har haft nytta av olika men i hög utsträckning relaterade teoretiska perspektiv som alla 
bidrar till att förklara de empiriska resultaten från studieområdet. Den klassiska gränsskolan 
härstammar från funktionalistiska tankar och ser gränsen framför allt som ett hinder som kan 
överskridas i och med en ökad genomtränglighet av fysiska barriärer. I Szczecinområdets fall 
kunde framför allt Berlins ökade dragningskraft observeras, med allt vanligare flygplats- och 
shoppingturer (se Papper I). Dessutom har tre–fyra tusen Szczecinbor flyttat över gränsen till 
tyska byar och småstäder för dagspendling (se Papper IV). Även tyskar korsar gränsen allt 
oftare, men sällan för mer än att tanka, småhandla eller köpa olika enklare tjänster exempelvis 
inom skönhets- respektive hälsoindustrin. Således kan man bara i begränsad utsträckning tala 
om en regional integration av gränsområdets två sidor såsom vid exempelvis Basel, Genève, 
Bratislava eller Öresund, där även arbetsmarknaden är alltmer sammanvävd. Gränseffekten 
förblir relativt stark och relationen kan snarare jämföras med den rumänska staden Oradeas 
kontakter med dess ungerska närområde samt Budapest. I Szczecinområdet har en del av 
regionens nyvunna potential genom gränsens öppning utnyttjats mer framgångsrikt än andra, 
och dessutom oproportionerligt av utifrån kommande aktörer inte minst från västra Tyskland. 
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I papper II och i ’kappan’ har diverse planer och visioner kring regionens utveckling jämförts 
från tiden före EU:s utvidgning med de senaste årens praxis och verkligheter. Det har visat sig 
att tidigare föreställningar kring områdets potential inte riktigt förverkligats, men också att 
flera av visionerna varit för ambitiösa och dubbeltydiga från början. Det har funnits, och i viss 
mån fortfarande finns, en naiv och närapå deterministisk föreställning att de två sidorna av 
gränsen ska integreras på grund av den historiska enhetligheten (före 1945). 
 
Papper III har studerat de gränsöverskridande kontakterna genom lokala och regionala eliters 
diskurser och narrativ gentemot den andra sidan. 38 intervjuer har genomförts med lokala och 
regionala beslutsfattare, akademiker, journalister, affärsfolk, samhällsplanerare, samt en 
skolledare. Resultaten ligger mestadels i linje med de officiella diskurserna och slutsatserna 
som nämns ovan. Detta papper samt ’kappan’ diskuterar även mitt och forskningsgruppens 
positionalitet: generellt har vi upplevt att utifrån-perspektivet varit en fördel som gjort 
intervjupersonerna mer öppna i sina berättelser. 
 
Papper IV redogör för lokalinvånares attityder genom en surveyundersökning som 102 
respondenter deltagit i. Denna studie har avslöjat ett polariserat attitydlandskap, inte minst i 
jämförelse med landstäckande opinionsundersökningar i såväl Tyskland som Polen. Detta 
stödjer tidigare studier som visat att känslor av tillhörighet kan vara särskilt accentuerade i 
gränslägen, där mer kontakt med den Andre förekommer. Den gränsöverskridande boende-
rörlighet som omnämns ovan har av flera forskare tolkats som en form av transnationell 
mobilitet, men uppfattningen av de som ser en sådan utveckling som ett försvinnande eller en 
hybridisering av gränsen bör revideras: det förblir nämligen oklart om den leder till en 
integrationseffekt mellan den gamla och den nya lokalbefolkningen. 
 
Som senare skolbildningar inom gränsforskningen har visat tenderar människor att utnyttja 
skillnader över gränsen snarare än att försöka övervinna dem, vilket gäller såväl ekonomiska 
fördelar – till exempel skillnader i priser och skatter – som kulturellt utbud och mångfald. 
Detta gäller inte minst när den Andres närvaro ses som en berikning snarare än något som ska 
införlämmas. Dilemmat är alltså att gränser behövs för att upprätthålla mångfald, samtidigt 
som de behöver överskridas för att skillnader ska kunna upplevas. Denna balansgång kan 
ibland vara svår att hålla men är värd att eftersträva. 
 
Resultaten här ligger generellt i linje med färsk forskning som visat på en fortsatt relevans av 
gränser även efter de fysiska barriärernas försvinnande. Ett annat bidrag till gränsstudierna är 
samtidigt att tiden för identiters och gränsens relevans är tillfällig, något som skulle behöva 
uppmärksammas mer i framtida forskning. I Szczecinområdet förekom (nationella) identiteter 
och markeringen av gränsen som särskilt viktiga just i tider som följt gränsens öppning, dvs 
under åren 1989–1990 samt 2007–2010. Även om betydelsen av gränsen förändras över tid 
kommer den att alltid existera i någon form, inte minst på grund av alla möjligheter som den 
erbjuder som resurs. 
 
Nyckelord: gränsöverskridande regional utveckling, tysk-polska gränsen, Szczecin (Stettin), 
(nationella) identiteter, gränsattityder, den Andre  
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Questionnaire to Polish residents in Vorpommern (July 2011) 
 
Any one person of age in the household may fill in the form, but should do it by her- or himself alone. 
Please underline the option that best fits your answer. Wherever reasonable, you may underline more 
than one option. 
 
1. What is your sex? Woman Man 
 
2. How old are you? 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
 
3. Do you live in: a single family house? a row house?  an apartment? 
 
4. When did you move to this part of Germany?   Before 1 May 2004 
   Between 1 May 2004 and 20 December 2007 
   Between 21 December 2007 and 30 April 2011 
   After 30 April 2011 
 
5. Where did you live before?   In Szczecin. 
  In Szczecin‟s vicinity (within 40-50 km). 
  Elsewhere in Poland. 
In which voivodship? …………………………….. 
  Elsewhere in Germany. 
In which state (Land)?.............................................. 
  In another country.  
In which one?……………………………………. 
 
6. Where do you currently work? In Poland. 
In Germany. 
In both countries.    
I currently do not work in either of these countries. 
 
7. Why did you move to this part of Germany? 
 I found cheaper/better housing (or land) than in Szczecin. 
 I like certain aspects of life in Germany. 
 I want to learn German. /I want my kids to learn German/I want my kids to go to a 
kindergarten or school in Germany. 
 For other reasons. For instance:……………………………………… 
 
8. Before moving here, have you considered any other place? 
No, I have not. 
    Yes, in the Szczecin-area. 
    Yes, elsewhere in Poland. 
    Yes, elsewhere in Germany. 
    Yes, in another country.  
Which one? ………… 
 
9. Are you generally satisfied with your choice to have moved here? 
 Yes, very Overall, yes      So-so Rather not 
 10. Approximately how often do you travel to Szczecin or to the Polish side of the borderland? 
   Every day/almost every day 
   Once or twice a week 
   Once or twice a month 
   Once or twice a year/almost never 
 10.1. To other places in Poland? 
   Once or twice a week 
   Once or twice a month 
   Once or twice a year/almost never 
 
11. If you travel to Szczecin, what means of transportation do you usually use? 
 
 Mostly car  Mostly public transport  Varying 
 
12. If you are crossing the border to Poland, do you think about that you are crossing a border? 
 
 Yes, always yes, often Occasionally       Rarely Almost never 
 
 12.1. Do you think about it: 
More and more often  Less and less often  
 
13. Generally speaking, how would you rate contemporary relations between… 
 
 13.1. …Poles and Germans in general? 
 Very good Good Varying Bad Very bad I don‟t know 
  
The relations are: improving. progressing varyingly. worsening. 
 
 13.2. …Poles and Germans in your town? 
 Very good Good Varying Bad Very bad I don‟t know 
  
 The relations are: improving. progressing varyingly. worsening. 
 
14. What is your perception of the Polish-German border? 
 
It is an obstacle and it is good if as many mobility barriers as possible are removed. 
 
One should consider the possible effects of dismantling barriers for each specific case. 
 
It is a necessary line of division to preserve the national peculiarities of both countries. 
 
15. What do you think about cross-border cooperation (in the form of cultural and educational 
exchange, a common labour market etc) between Vorpommern and Zachodniopomorze? 
 
 It is a positive feature and should be encouraged even more. 
 Its current intensity is just satisfactory. 
 It is already encouraged more than necessary. 
 
16. How would you rate your own knowledge of the German language? 
 
 Fluent Good Intermediate  Beginner‟s level 
  
 16.1. In case you did not tick fluent, do you plan to make any improvements? 
 
  Yes Maybe/I don‟t know Probably not 
 
17. Do you plan to stay in this part of Germany in the coming 5-10 years? 
 
 Yes, definitely   Probably yes  Maybe Rather not 
 17.1. If you have ticked „Maybe‟ or „Rather not‟, do you have any plans to move to:  
Szczecin or to its vicinity? 
  elsewhere in Poland? 
  elsewhere in Germany? 
  to a third country? Which one? 
 
18. If you have any other personal comments, please write them here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to receive a small thank-you gift, please mark your choice and indicate and address to which it 
can be sent. 
 
I would like to have a: small chocolate 
Stockholm-kitchen magnet 
magnetic bookmark        
  
sent to the following address: 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
 
  
Questionnaire to German residents in Vorpommern (July 2011) 
 
Any one person of age in your household may fill in the questionnaire, but should do it by her- or 
himself alone. Please underline the option that best fits your answer. Wherever reasonable, you may 
underline more than one option. 
 
1. What is your sex? Woman Man 
 
2. How old are you? 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
 
3. Do you live in: a single family house? a row-house?  an apartment? 
 
4. Have you ever been to Poland? 
 Yes, but just right across the border, in Stettin (Szczecin) or its vicinity. 
 Yes, even further inside Poland. 
 No, never. 
 
In case you ticked “No, never”, please continue from question nr. 5. 
 
4.1. Approximately how many times have you been to…  
4.1.1 …Stettin (Szczecin) or the Polish side of the border in the last 20-22 yrs? 
  Once or twice a week 
  Once or twice a month 
  Once or twice a year 
  Once or twice altogether 
 
 4.1.2 …Stettin (Szczecin) or the Polish side of the border in the last 6-7 years? 
Once or twice a week 
  Once or twice a month 
  Once or twice a year 
  Once or twice altogether 
 
 4.1.3 …to other places in Poland? 
  Once or twice a month 
  Once or twice a year 
  Once or twice altogether 
 
4.2. What were your reasons for going to Stettin (Szczecin) or to the Polish side of the border? 
 
 Shopping Healthcare Wellness Historic tourism  
 
 Visiting friends/relatives Other reasons. Example: 
 
4.2.1. If you have been elsewhere in Poland, what was your main reason for going there? 
 
 Holidays/wellness Healthcare/wellness Visiting friends/relatives 
 
 Other reasons. For example: 
 
4.3. If you are travelling to Poland more than once or twice a year, what is your primary choice of 
transportation? 
 Mostly car Varying Mostly public transport 
 
4.4. When crossing the border to Poland, do you think about that in that moment? 
 
 Always Often Occasionally       Rarely Almost never 
 
 4.4.1. Do you think about it:  More and more often? Less and less often? 
 
5. If you have never been to Poland, do you plan to ever go there? 
 
 Yes, at some point. Maybe/I don‟t know. Rather not. 
 
6. Overall, how would you rate the current relations between… 
 
 6.1 …Germans and Poles in general? 
 
 Very good Good Varying Bad Very bad I don‟t know 
 
 They are:  improving. stagnating/unevenly developing. worsening. 
 
 6.2 …Germans and Poles in your town? 
 
 Very good Good Varying Bad Very bad I don‟t know 
 
 They are: improving. stagnating/unevenly developing. worsening. 
 
7. How do you perceive of the Polish-German border? 
 
It is an obstacle and it is good if as many mobility barriers as possible are removed. 
 
One should consider the possible effects of dismantling barriers for each specific case. 
 
It is a necessary line of division to preserve the national peculiarities of both countries. 
 
8. What do you think about cross-border cooperation (in the form of cultural and educational 
exchange, a common labour market etc) between Vorpommern and Zachodniopomorze? 
 
 It is a positive feature and should be encouraged even more. 
 Its current intensity is just satisfactory. 
 It is already encouraged more than necessary. 
 
9. Do you know any Polish? 
 No, I do not. I know a little Polish. I get by. I know Polish well. 
 
10. Do you plan to stay in Uecker-Randow in the coming 5-10 years? 
 Yes, definitely Rather yes  Maybe Rather not 
 
10.1. If you ticked “Maybe” or “Rather not”, do you have any plans to move elsewhere? If yes, where?  
Somewhere else in Germany. 
 Somewhere else in Europe/in the world. Where? 
 
11. If you have any other comments, please write them here below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To retrieve your small thank-you gift, please underline your choice and specify an address to which it 
can be sent. 
 I would like to have a:  small chocolate 
Stockholm-kitchen magnet 
magnetic bookmark     
 
sent to the following address: 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The original versions of the questionnaires – in Polish and German, respectively – can be requested 
from the author.) 
 
 
